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There have been few attempts to combine the historical
social, and political variables which make up the regional
system that is the Horn of Africa. This work presents an
encapsulated analysis that attempts to provide a "complete
picture" of the attitudes, events and external intrusions
which contribute to the situation as it exists today.
The Horn of Africa is viewed from four perspectives: (1)
internal aspects, (2) regional linkages, (3) external
influences, and (4) an historical interpretation. These
four viewpoints are integrated to form strategic con-
siderations and conclusions regarding the region and the
potential areas of conflict or cooperation between the
involved actors during the next decade.
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play an active and crucial political role , not only in
Africa, but in the international system. This research
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Geography is the force which has caused international
concern with the Horn of Africa. Because of their location,
the countries which make up the Horn are involved in the
political realities of the Middle East, the Indian Ocean,
(including the Persian Gulf), and, of course, Africa. Oil
from Iran to Israel and Europe, and the renewed flow of
commerce between East Africa, Asia, and the Gulf must pass
near the Somali coast, through the Straits of the Bab-el-Mandib
,
and along the coast of Ethiopia and Eritrea en route to the
Suez Canal. Naturally, the ability to monitor the traffic
and to conduct military operations against targets on the
sea lanes from coastal ports and airfields on the Horn has
occupied the minds of many strategists. Not surprisingly,
these capabilities have been the genesis of much of the
external involvement in the area. Of equal, if not greater,
importance is the significance of the Horn as a "spring-board"
into central and southern Africa, the oil rich Arabian Pen-
insula and the sensitive areas of Sudan and Egypt.
The events of 1977 have resulted in a need to reevaluate
critically long standing notions about the Horn. The con-
tinuing conflict between the two principal regional actors
(Ethiopia and Somalia) and the impending escalation of events
in Eritrea have impacted not only on United States policy

and strategies in the region, but have resulted in grave
concern in bordering states where the United States has vital
interests
.
The complete renversement of the Ethiopians and Somalis
and the introduction of Soviet and Cuban military forces and
hardware has attracted the interests of the Arab and African
Worlds. This introduction of additional actors and the con-
comitant conflict between previously clear interests and
strategies creates a situation of potential great danger for
stability in a region contiguous with the already super-
critical Middle East.
Most studies relative to the Horn, its actors and their
relationships with the rest of the world tend to fall into
three categories -- pure history, social anthropology, and
political science. This statement is probably true of studies
done on any region or state and of itself is unremarkable
,
yet a closer examination of the work on the Horn reveals a
major shortcoming. The fact is that although a good many
excellent books have been written about each of these aspects
with regard to the Horn, there have been few attempts to
weave together all three aspects in order to obtain a complete
picture. The historian tends to report events and usually
stops at 1960; the sociologist or social anthropologist
usually looks at a small section of the region without much
regard for the remainder; and most political analysts seem to
think that the Horn of Africa emerged from the ocean in 19 45.
10

The possible exception to the rule is Richard Greenfield,
whose work, Ethiopia - A New Political History , has become
a classic. Greenfield also seemed to feel a need for a new
approach in analyzing the major political entity on the Horn:
"Ethiopia is an ancient country and no at-
tempt to understand its complicated internal
politics and the motivations of the several
groups and interests involved could even be-
gin without some examination of their roots
which, since Ethiopia was not affected by the
colonial era in the same way as the rest of
Africa, extend far back into the history and
mythology of that land. For this reason the
emphasis of this book are bound to differ
from those adopted in studies of other African
nations . "
*
Greenfield was speaking about Ethiopia but with a few word
substitutions he could have been describing the entire Horn
of Africa. His analysis stopped as of 1960 but it is in
that spirit that this work is attempted.
A. SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
A review of the literature relating to the Horn of
Africa reveals that there are many useful works which examine
individual countries but only a few which treat the region
as a whole. Of the latter Dr. Tom J. Farer's Warclouds on
3the Horn of Africa is the most recent and probably the best
Greenfield, Richard, Ethiopia - A New Political History
,
Praeger Publishers, 1965. ~
2 Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 2.
3
Farer , Tom J., Warclouds on the Horn of Africa
,
Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 19 76. See elaboration of
this critique in Chapter IV.
11

of an unexceptional series of English language works. This
book, written before the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, examines
the Horn from a geopolitical perspective in an attempt to
develop policy recommendations. While Dr. Farer's analysis
was excellent, his conclusions that the United States would
support the Ethiopians and the Soviet Union the Somalis in
a contest for the Horn, were considerably off the mark.
A plethora of works have been published on Ethiopia with
the principal ones of general value being: Greenfield, dis-
4
cussed above, Edward Ullendorff's The Ethiopians
,
and
Richard Pankhurst's extremely detailed Economic History of
Ethiopia. Ullendorff's contribution is another classic,
an extremely readable social-anthropological look at Ethiopia
Unfortunately he does not apply his considerable talent to
any examination whatsoever of political and social problems.
Pankhurst's volume is a compendium of facts, primarily eco-
nomic data but including a number of social and historical
insights, about Ethiopia up to 1935. He also includes some
data on Somalia and the Horn in general. This work is in-
valuable as a source for any serious examination of the Horn.
Narrower in scope but still of significant value are Sergew
Hable Sellassie's Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to
4
Ullendorff, Edward, The Ethiopians , Oxford University
Press, 19 65.
Pankhurst , Richard, Economic History of Ethiopia
,
Haile
Selassie I University Press, 19 68.
12

1270 which is an extremely well researched work and probably
the definitive study of a rather obscure yet very important
7
period on the Horn; Wax and Gold by Donald M. Levine , an
examination of Amhara culture and tradition which provides
tremendous insight into the forces which have moulded the
Ethiopians into the people they are today; and Ernest W.
p
Lefever's important book Spear and Scepter an examination
of the role of the army, police and politics of Ethiopia
through mid 1970.
The leading authority on Somalia is I.M. Lewis whose
9 10books A Pastoral Democracy and A Modern History of Somaliland
and numerous articles have developed the idea of Somali
"nationhood." He is well supplemented by Saadia Touval
,
Somali Nationalism and John Drysdale's definitive The Somali
12Dispute
. Both Touval and Drysdale examine in depth the
formation of Somali irredentism and the continuing border
disputes between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.
Sellassie, Sergew Hable , Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian
History to 1270
,
Haile Selassie I University Press, 1972.
















, A Modern History of Somaliland , Praeger
Publishers, 196 5.









At this point the contribution of Irving Kaplan, et al
at the Foreign Area Studies Directorate of The American
University must be mentioned. Their series of handbooks
which compile basic facts about the social, economic, pol-
itical and military institutions and practices of selected
13
countries include The Area Handbook for Ethiopia and
14
The Area Handbook for Somalia . Although no attempt is
made to analyze the enormous amount of data contained in
these works, they remain extremely useful as sources for any
student of the Horn.
Eritrea and Djibouti are surprisingly ignored as objects
of serious scholarly attention. G.K.N. Trevaskis has done
an extremely capable and serious job of examining Eritrea
and the roots of its secessionist drives in his well known
Eritrea - A Colony in Transition , albeit the majority of
the work deals with the British trusteeship. Adloff and
Thompson's Djibouti and the Horn of Africa is somewhat
dated but represents the best English language effort on
documenting the former French territory. It must be pointed
13 Kaplan, Irving, et al, Area Handbook for Ethiopia
,
Government Printing Office, 1971. ~ "
14-
.




Trevaskis, G.K.N. , Eritrea - A Colony in Transition
,
Oxford University Press, 196 0.
~
1 6
Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard, Djibouti and
the Horn of Africa, Stanford University Press, 1963.
14

out, however, that virtually every author who writes on
Ethiopia or Somalia discusses, to a greater or lesser degree,
the historical, social and political aspects of Djibouti and
Eritrea
.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
As related above, there have been few attempts to combine
the historical, social, and political variables which make
up the regional system that is the Horn of Africa. This effort
is an attempt to present an encapsulated analysis that will
provide a "complete picture" of the attitudes, events and
external intrusions which have contributed to the situation
as it exists today. Given the constraints of time and space
this study will focus on the following questions:
1. What are the origins of the Somali and Eritrean
disputes on the Horn and what are the salient factors in
the continuing hostilities?
2. What are the interests and policy objectives of the
actors and what is the impact of regionally involved ex-
ternal actors?
3. What areas of possible conflict and cooperation
between the involved actors and what strategic considerations
can be derived from them for the next decade?
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The main focus of this paper is upon internal trends in
Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea; and upon the impact and
15

influence of external powers whose intrusion into the essen-
tially bipolar region of the Horn has tended to exacerbate
already extant prejudices and accelerate the forces of change
and fissiparous tendencies
.
Initially, an historical analysis will be used to enable
the reader to identify salient variables in the relationship
among the actors and the effects of primordialism and change
on the regional actors through 1945. From this point the
author shall undertake more detailed analysis of events
since 1945 from a foreign policy perspective. This analysis
will emphasize the emergence of distinct objectives and
interests among the regional actors . An evaluation of the
interests and objectives of the external actors will then be
made in an attempt to identify areas of potential conflict
or cooperation. Finally, conclusions and recommendations, as
appropriate, will be offered.
Threaded throughout the discussion will be observations
on the impact of technology and situational factors on the
cultures of the Horn. Much of this study will be influenced
by personal observations and experiences of the author while
assigned to the Defense Attache's Office in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia from August 19 76 to June 1977. During that time the
author was fortunate to travel extensively in Ethiopia and
spent a number of days in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya and Sudan.
Although unable to travel to Somalia he did have the opportunity
16

to discuss that country with members of the Diplomatic
Corps (both United States and other country representatives)
who served or visited there.
The Horn of Africa has, does, and will in the future,
p^Lay an active and crucial political role
,
not only in
Africa, but in the international system. It is hoped that
this work can in some small measure provide policy makers




II. THE REGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND EARLY HISTORY
A. THE REGION
The Horn enjoys a special status on the continent of
Africa. It is neither North African with an Arab/Mediter-
ranean orientation, Middle Eastern with its Hellenic in-
fluences, nor is it "Black African" with the great struggles
for independence from colonial rule . It is a region which
has absorbed aspects of culture, religion, historical expe-
rience, language and values from all three contiguous areas,
and from Europe and Asia as well.
"In its long history the (Horn of Africa)
has always formed a bridge between Africa
and Asia... (and) has always occupied a
favored place at a crossroads of civil- ,
_
ization and a meeting point of many races."
The political subdivisions on the Horn include all or
parts of the states of Ethiopia (including Eritrea), the
Somali Democratic Republic (Somalia), Kenya, and Djibouti
(until recently the French Territory of Afars and Issas).
Each of these actors will be discussed in some detail in
the chapters which follow.
The physical geography of the region is a microcosm of
the topography of Africa. Nearly as large as western
Europe, the Horn is a "vast spearhead" which juts out into
17Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 2 3
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the Indian Ocean forming the southern shore of the Gulf of
Aden (see Map 1, p. 20). The major physical feature on the
Horn is the Ethiopian Massif which rises to altitudes of
15,000 feet in the north central part of Ethiopia. The
plateau, as these rugged mountains are sometimes called,
is bifurcated by the Great Rift Valley which splits the
Horn roughly in two. These two disruptions of the earth's
surface have made the central portions of the Horn one of
the most isolated and least known spots in Africa.
The northern mouth of the Great Rift Valley contains
the Danakil Plains. This stretch of desert runs along
the coast of the Red Sea and at points drops 381 feet
below sea level. Less than forty miles aways and paral-
leling this arid plain are the mountains of the northern
half of the Massif, the Amhara Plateau, which rise to
6,7 00 feet. The citadel effect of this escarpment is well
known and often referred to as a reason for the survival of
1 8
the Ethiopian Empire. To the west the Massif falls off
in a series of terraces and canyons down to the Sudanese
plain. The gorge of the Blue Nile winds its spectacular
19
way through this broken country to Khartoum. On the east
18
Hess, Robert L., Ethiopia: The Modernization of
Autocracy, p. 7, Cornell University Press, 1970.
19 For a graphic discription of the Blue Nile Gorge see
Moorehead, Alan, The Blue Nile
,
pp. 9-20, New English Library,
1974. The author can attest to his accuracy by personal










1 - Danakil Plains
MAP 1 - Physical Features Adapted from Lipskey, Ethiopia,
p. 29 and, Hess, Ethiopia, p. 3.
20

and south the descent from the southern plateau is not so
precipitous as it slides rather gradually down to from the
Somali Plateau. This is a region of typical African veld,
a hot arid bushland which traditionally has been barely
able to support the livestock of the nomadic herders that
cross it in a never ending search for water and graze.
Scattered throughout the Horn are concentrations of dense
tropical jungle and forested areas.
Temperature and vegetation are used by the inhabitants
to designate climactic zones. For example, the daga refers
to the "cold" zone where the region is alpine in nature
;
averages 8,000 feet above sea level; and the maximum temper-
atures seldom exceed 60 degrees in the hottest months. The
temperate zone is called wayna dega . Temperatures average
about 7 degrees and it is in this zone that the richest
agricultural areas are found. The k'olla includes the
veld, desert and bad lands. Its literal translation is
"hot" and Somalia falls within this zone in its entirety.
In short, the physical geography of the Horn of Africa
contains representative examples of virtually every type of
climatalogical and geographic phenomena found elsewhere




Just as the topography and climate of the Horn is varied,
so too are its peoples . As each of the regional actors is
21

discussed in the pages that follow, ethnic and linguistic
differences will become apparent. In Ethiopia alone, over
seventy languages and two hundred dialects are spoken and
20
there are at least nine major ethnic groups. An exam-
ination of these plus -the Somali, Masai, Kikuyu and all
the other lesser groups which inhabit the region of the
Horn would occupy many more pages than are available in
a study of this nature. Map 2, p. 23 provides some idea
of the population pattern on the Horn.
Generally two major types of people predominate, the
cultivator of the highlands and the nomadic herdsman of
the low plains . The former category includes the descend-
ants of a Semetic people which invaded the Horn from the
Arabian Peninsula around 1,000 B.C. The Amhara and Tigre
elites of Ethiopia are the representative type of this
group. The Somali tribes, on the other hand, typify the
nomadic warrior of the savanna and desert. Situated between
the two and intermingled to some extent are the largest
single ethnic group on the Horn, the Galla (Oromo) peoples.
This "group in the middle" are the descendants of purely
African groups which moved into the Horn some four hundred
years ago. Originally probably nomadic, they have tended
to adopt the lifestyle of the region they inhabit and
therefore are divided between a nomadic and settled existence
20 .
Lipsky, George A., Ethiopia: Its People, Its Society















A similar dichotomy exists in Sudan where the northern tribes,
Arabacised descendants of the Nubians of old, and the southern
groups, a mixture of several hundred black African tribes who
still remember the depredations of Arab and Abyssinian slave
raiders .
In addition to classification by means of subsistence,
the people of the Horn can be categorized by religion. The
cultivator/warrior of the highland tends to hold to the
rite of the Ethiopian Coptic Church and sees himself as the
defender of "a Christian island in a Moslem sea." The
roving nomad found Islam to be the religion best. suited to
his needs and throughout history has followed the call of
j ihad for the conversion of the pagan and Christian elements.
Finally, among the Galla and small scattered ethnic groups
can be found large number of Pagans and the rapidly diminishing
group of Falasha Jews. Moreover, it should be noted that
each ethnic group has its own religious minority, i.e. there
are nomadic Christians and Moslem farmers , but as a general
rule the classification holds true.
In any event, throughout its history the factors of
ethnicity, geography, culture, and religion have generated
conflict and instability on the Horn.
C. EARLY HISTORY
1. In the Beginning
In the year 72 5 B.C. the ancient kingdom of Meroe
was at the height of its power. Kush, as this kingdom was
24

also known, stretched from Egypt to Uganda and her trade
routes crossed what is now Ethiopia to Punt (Somalia) and
21
Saba (the Arabian Peninsula)
.
At about this time , Semetic peoples from the region
of Yemen began to migrate to the Horn. Through intermarriage
and conquest they merged with the indigenous peoples and a
new culture began to develop. Its center was the city of Axum,
directly astride the trade routes to the east. After estab-
lishing a major port at Adulis , on the Red Sea coast, Axum
developed contacts with Greek, Roman, Egyptian, Arabian and
22 . .
Indian cultures . Axumite armxes , in the meantime , ranged
far over northern Ethiopia and into Sudan and Egypt. They
destroyed the city of Meroe and conquered a large
2 3portion of southern Arabia.
Axum reached her zenith as a world power in the
first century A.D. but played a significant role in the
region until the rise of Islam in the seventh century. In
the year 3 30 A.D. the Axumite King, Ezana, adopted Chris-
tianity and contacts were established with the Byzantines
.
21See Sellassie, Ancient and Medieval History
,
especially
chapters I and II for an outstanding treatment of pre-Axumite





2 3Ullendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 54.
25

The first Bishop of Axum, Frumentus , laid the foundation
for the Ethiopian Church which was to play such an important
24
role in future events on the Horn.
Its decline saw the Axumite Empire fragment into
regions controlled by petty warlords or kings , whose power
extended only so far as their spears would reach. Axum's
legacy, then, was the framework for the feudal/Christian
culture that typified Ethiopia until 1974.
The decline of the Axumites coincided with the advent
of Islam on the Horn. The effect of the spread of Islam was
to cut off the Ethiopian highlands from the rest of the
world. It has been said that Axum was spared the Jihad
because of the provision of sanctuary to the followers of
25
Mohammed who had fled persecution in Mecca. A more pro-
bable reason was the formidable terrain and the Axumite
soldier. At any rate, early incursions by the Arabs were
slaving expeditions into the Beja country to the north and
the Somali regions in the south, and along the coastal strip.
These expeditions spread Islam in two ways: (1) true con-
version, and (2) conversion to avoid slavery.
The net effect of this sweep of Islam across North-
east Africa was to force the pagan Beja tribes southward,
increasing pressure on the Axumites and slowly forcing the
24Greenfield, Ethiopia
, pp. 25-26.
25 Sellassie, Ancient and Medieval History, pp. 190-191.
26

heart of the Empire in a southerly direction. As the coastal
peoples and the Somalis became Islamicised, the Axumite
Empire became smaller and smaller. Surrounded by Moslem peoples
it did in fact become a "Christian island" for the first, •
but not the last, time.
A resurgence of Axumite power occurred in the late
ninth and early tenth centuries with the reoccupation of the
Red Sea littoral and the re-establishment of communications
with Arabia by the Axumite Dynasty. However, the Empire's
final decline commenced with pressures from the Beja Tribes
and the rise of Gudit (Judith), a queen of the Agau people.
Gudit and her ferocity form the basis of many Ethiopian legends
Some called her a Falasha Jew, others a Moslem, and others
yet a pagan; but all agree her persecution of the Christian
religion was not exceeded in the Horn until the advent of
Ahmed Gragn in the 16th century. Gudit nearly succeeded
in eliminating Christianity in the Horn and established the
27
Agau Dynasty which lasted until the year 1137. After
Gudit ' s death, a bishop named Selama was dispatched from
Egypt to renew the Christian faith. Once again a churchman
was to have significant impact on the course of history on
the Horn, and for the next eight hundred years the patriarch
9 fi
Ahmed Gragn is discussed in detail in the next section
,
27
See Sellassie, Ancient and Medieval History
,
pp. 2 2 5-




of the Ethiopian Church was an Egyptian. Thus, the original
Greek Orthodoxy of the church began to blend with the Coptic
faith of Egypt until it became the unique Ethiopian church
it is today.
In the year 1137 the throne passed from the last true
Agau ruler (who inherited it from the Axumites) to a new dynasty,
29 . .
the Zagw/e , who claimed descent from Moses . The Zagwe origi-
nated in the area called Lasta and endured for 13 3 years. The
most notable of the Zagwe rulers was King Lalibella whose name
is immortalized in the rockhewn churches he had constructed
at his birthplace, the town of Roha . Although the Zagwes can
be credited with reopening contacts with the outside world,
notably with Jerusalem and Egypt, they have never been accepted
as "rightful rulers" by the Ethiopians. As Ullendorff puts its:
"Their usurpation of the throne is regarded
as a sinister interregnum. . .The historical
fiction of an uninterrupted line of kings
descended from Menelik I, the son of King
Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, has very
deep roots in Ethiopia and must be regarded
as one of the most powerful and influential
national sagas anywhere in the world."
Ibid., p. 232. Ullendorff, The Ethiopians
,
p. 61, calls
this bishop Dan' el, Sellassie's work seems more carefully
researched therefore the use of Selama.
29 Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 33.
30Ullendorff, The Ethiopians
,
p. 64. I have attached a copy
of the legend as Appendix A. It is important to Ethiopian his-
tory as it forms the basis for the legitimacy of the Emperors.
As long as relatives of Hailie Selassie I live, they have a
claim to the throne of Ethiopia. Article 2 of the revised Con-
stitution of 1955 (admittedly suspended) read: "The Imperial
dignity shall remain perpetually attached to the line of Hailie
Selassie I, descendant of King Sahle Selassie, whose line des-
cends without interruption from the Dynasty of Menelik I, son




With the death' of Lalibella the Zagwe Dynasty began its
decline and once again the Church assumed a decisive role.
In 1270 A.D. the Egyptian-appointed Abuna (bishop)
died and an Ethiopian priest was appointed temporary bishop.
This man was Tekle Haimanot, who became known as the "Benedict
of Ethiopia." He is the only Ethiopian to be canonized by
the Coptic Church. Another churchman of prominence at this
time was the Abbot of the Monastary of Haik , Yesus Mo ' a
.
These two men were to become the architects for the restora-
tion of the Solomonid line. Their conviction that the
Solomonids were to be preferred was not only based on reli-
gious grounds (i.e. the elect of God) but economic grounds
as well. Tekle Haimanot was offered one-third of the land
of Ethiopia and Yesus Mo ' a the position of what would today
31be called Secretary of State in return for their influence.
Their assistance was invaluable to the aspiring Yekuno Amlak,
The intriguers were successful and he was able to assume the
throne. Yekuno Amlak was a strong and resourceful ruler and
was able to consolidate his power. With the appointment of
a new Abuna from Egypt, he was able to regain some degree of
control over the churchmen - but, the church through its vast
landholdings (including those of Tekle Haimanot) and its
influence over the population had gained a temporal foothold
that was to continue until 19 74.
31Sellassie, Ancient and Medieval History, p. 286
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2 . I ' fat to the Gragn - the Moslem Assaults
The fall of the Zagwe Dynasty to the forces of Tekle
Haimanot and Yekuno Amlak, the "rightful" king who traced his
ancestry to the union of Solomon and Sheba, marks the beginning
32
of modern historical documentation on the Horn of Africa.
The center of this new dynasty, the Solomonid, became
the central Amhara Plateau. This, the second southward shift,
occurred as a result of the continuing pressure from the pagan
tribes to the north and the new force, to the Horn at least,
of religious expansion and conquest. The overriding foreign
policy of the new Emperor and his successors for the next
several hundred years was the liquidation, or at least con-
tainment, of the newly emerging Moslem sultanates in the
southern reaches of the Horn. The primary enemy was the
Sultanate of I ' fat which had begun to encroach deeply into
33Shoa province
.
In the beginning the Ethiopians were not overly
successful, and the Moslem sultanate expanded to the north
gaining control over all of Shoa. By 131U the tide began to
turn and the Emperors expanded their boundaries south and
eastward. Amda Sion (Yekuno Amlak 's son) burned Zeiia in
32 Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 45, calls this period the
beginning of a "literary rennaissance" on the Horn.
33
See Oliver, Roland (ed), The Cambridge History of
Africa, Vol. 3, from c. 1050 to c. 1600 , Cambridge University
„
Press, 1977, pp. mo-164 for an excellent account of Christian




1332. The struggle between the two faiths continued until
in the year 1441 Emperor Zara Yakob , perhaps the most suc-
cessful emperor of the era, was able to consolidate the gains
made by his, armies and those of his predecessors. He defeated
Sultan Badlay ibn As 'ad-Din and broke the power of I ' f at for
35
once and for all.
With Zari Yakob ' s death in 1494 Ethiopia was racked
by the now characteristic struggle for power and the Sultanate
of Adal began a period of ascendancy. Border warfare broke
out between the two and continued until 1508. In that year
Lebna Dengel became Emperor of Ethiopia and attempted to deal
decisively with the, by now, major threat posed by Adal. It
is during his reign that the struggle for the Horn begins to
reach it's peak.
The war began well for the Ethiopians. In 1516 Lebna
Dengel successfully ambushed an invading Moslem army, killing
it's commander and inflicting heavy losses. He pressed
his advantage, invading Adal and laying waste to the region.
Coincidentally , a Portugese fleet, finding Zelia deserted
with it's Somali garrison away fighting Lebna Dengel, attacked
37
and burnt the city for the second time in it's history.
35 Oliver, Cambridge History, Vol. 3
,
p. 155.




Ibid., p. 72. See page 30 above for the first burning
of Zeilia by Amda Sion.
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Lebna Dengel was a hero and "tranquility and peace
3 8
reigned in all the dominions of the Negus (king)." It
was in these peaceful times that a Portugese delegation
arrived in Ethiopia. The Portugese remained for six years,
from 1520 to 1526, without making significant impact on the
Emperor or the country. The first Portugese interlude gave
no hint of the decisive role that the Europeans would play
in the region just twenty years later.
Adal meanwhile was torn by internal strife and near
civil war. The victor in this internecine conflict was a
man of legend — Emir Ahmed ibn Ibrahaim al-Ghazi — better
known as Ahmed Gragn (the left handed). By 1529 Gragn was
in control in Adal and:
"...had welded the Danakil and Somalis into
a formidable striking force, inspired by the
old ideal of the Jihad and lust of conquest
and plunder. He initially concentrated on
limited raids and incursions .. .but in 1529
. . .he struck and inflicted a major defeat
on Lebna Dengel... He was finally ready to
begin the great conquest and invasion
which inundated the entire territory of
traditional Abyssinia." 3
By the year 1534 Gragn had laid wast to most of
Ethiopia. With the assistance of Turkish mercenaries
(matchlockmen) from the Ottomans he had virtually destroyed
the Ethiopian armies. Lebna Dengel died almost unattended,
33 T v - ,Ibid.
39Ullendorff, The Ethiopians
,
p. 73. See Oliver,
Cambridge History, Vol. 3
, pp. 172-173 for details on this
battle
.
Over 10,000 Ethiopians died and Lebna Dengel' s power




in hiding, but not before calling upon Portugal for aid.
The response was slow but significant. In 1541 four hundred
matchlockmen under Christophe de Gama disembarked at Massawa
and began a trek inland to join Galadewos (Lebna Dengel's
40
son and successor) . The Ethiopian equivalent of the
battle of the Marne was about to begin.
At the time the Portugese reenforcements arrived
Galadewos was literally a refugee in his own country and the
armies of the Gragn were ravaging at will. Joining forces
with a small contingent of Eritreans under Bhar Negash (king
of the sea) Yeshaq the Portugese began to march inland. At
the same time Galadewos began to march north from Shoa
,
41gathering forces as he went. In four battles which took
place in late 1542 and early 1543 Galadewos and the Portugese
ensured that the Horn of Africa would continue to be con-
tentious ground.
The first and second battles of Lake Ashangi involved
the small force of Portugese and Eritreans and Gragn ' s main
army. The battles were not decisive but did result in the
retreat of the Muslims and the wounding of Gragn. They also
served to raise the spirits of Galadewos' followers who were
rapidly moving north. Ahmed Gragn retreated to the edge of
40Oliver, Cambridge History
,
Vol. 3, p. 177.
41
Ibid., p. 181. Also see Greenfield, Ethiopia
, pp
4S-53 for a summarization of the Portugese involvement
and Gragn' s Jihad.
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the escarpment which overlooks the Danakil plain and called
for more help from his allies. He returned with reenforce-
ments of Arab, Turkish and Albanian matchlockmen and in a
savage battle in the rain dispersed the Emperor's forces,
killing half of the Portugese and taking De Gama prisoner.
42
DeGama was later executed.
This success on the shores of Lake Tana caused Gragn
to feel he had won a decisive victory. He sent his Albanian
and Arab reenforcements home and established a camp in the
vicinity of the town of Woina-Dega. From here he was deter-
1+3
mined to consolidate his new empire
.
Galadewos and the surviving Portugese rallied near
the town of Debaroa and after making their own gunpowder from
local materials they mounted sufficient forces to challenge
Gragn. In a surprise attack on 22 February 1453 the Ethiopian
and Portugese force was able to defeat a numerically superior
Muslim army. Their success was largely due to the death of
Gragn from Portugese musket fire. The Somali and Danakil
tribesmen broke and fled at Gragn' s fall but the Turkish




Jones, A.H.M. and Monroe, Elizabeth, A History of
Ethiopia, pp. 84-86, Clarendon Press, 1970.
44
See Jones and Monroe, A History of Ethiopia
,
pp. 84-85,
for a vivid account of this battle. Known to history as the




No account speculates as to the extent of casualties
in these battles . But if one assumes the Portugese and Turkish
casualties to be an indicator, the indigenous casualties must
have been enormous . Of the four hundred Portugese and two
hundred Turks involved, only one hundred twenty of the former
45
and forty of the latter survived the battle
.
Had Gragn won, the Horn would have been a Moslem state
controlled by a Somali elite instead of the arena of conflict
that it is today. But, without the charisma of Gragn' s per-
sonal leadership, the internal unity and discipline of the Army
disintegrated. The Somali and Danikil warriors, which formed
the core of the army, simply went home. Although Adal con-
tinued in its attempts to rally the tribesmen, and succeeded
in mounting at least two major offensives (in 1559 Galadewos
was killed in one of them) , it never again became a serious
46
threat to the Ethiopian Empire
.
Turkish involvement with Gran prompted the Ottomans
to try to move into the highlands of Eritrea. They were
defeated in 1578 by Sarsa Dengel, the son of Galadewos'
successor. The Turks retreated retaining only the port
45
Turkish casualties are from Jones and Monroe, ibid.,
p. 85. Portugese casualties and another account of the battle
can be found in Oliver, Cambridge History
,
Vol. 3, pp. 180-182.
46 Jones and Monroe, A History of Ethiopia
,
p. 85. Also






city of Massawa as a toehold. Islam had been defeated,
for a time, but two new intrusive forces became apparent
on the Horn, the Galla and Roman Catholicism.
3 . Pagans , Popes , and Princes
The human sea of nomads from the south which is known
as the Galla migrations began about the middle of the six-
teenth century -- around the time of Galadewos ' death. In
fact, the Moslem army which defeated his forces and killed
him forewent the invasion of Ethiopia in order to return to
48
their homes to protect them from the onslaught of the Galla.
These migrations continued for three hundred years . Unfor-
tunately for the historian, the period of the migrations
coincides with the "dark ages" on the Horn.
This three hundred year period was to become known
as the Zemana Mesafint (Era of the Princes). The entire
Horn, the Empire as well as he Sultanates, suffered a complete
breakdown of central authority. The region was ruled by
Rases (Dukes) and Shifta (outlaw bands) who continually
49fought with and against one another for local control.




Gray, Richard, The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. 4
from c. 1600 to c. 1790
,
p. 53 9, Cambridge University Press,
1977
. Gray provides a truely insightful and comprehensive
account of the Galla migrations into the Horn.
49 Greenfield, Ethiopia
,
p. 67. Greenfield writes the
most lucid and easy reading account of the Zemana Mesafint
,
see p . 67-75 .
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The great battles and dramas which took place as the pagan
wave of Galla broke and swept over the twin rocks of Islam
and Christianity are shrouded in mystery. Ullendorff has
succinctly presented the impact of these peoples on the region
"The vacuum created by the long drawn wars
between Muslims and Christians and the con-
sequent weakening of both enabled the Galla
to scale the mountain chains in the east and
south of the great plateau ...( they ) swamped
most parts of Shoa province .. .They settled
all along the outer finges of the plateau
in an immense semicircle, leaving untouched
only the northern highlands , the area of the
old Axumite Kindgom. . .The Muslims farad no
better. The Gallas invaded the Karar region
and settled everywhere - except the city
itself. The Iman transferred his seat to
Auassa." 50
The Galla contributed nothing to either civiliaztion
on the Horn. They had no technology and no material culture.
The social organization of their various tribes was not as
sophisticated as those indigenous to the area. They were
not to become assimilated in either culture and remained
largely a third group on the Horn. The two major actors
on the Horn, Ethiopia and Somalia, have competed for the
Galla' s alligance at various times and with varying degrees
of success up to the present day.
5 Ullendorff, The Ethiopians
,
p. 77.
A modern example is the Galla duplicity at Mai-Chew
during the war with Italy (1935). When it became apparent
that the Emperor's cause was lost, the Galla went over en masse
to the Italians
. Another example is the close cooperation be-
tween the Western Somali Liberation Front and the Galla (Oromo)
separatists in Bale and Sidamo Provinces during the recent
fighting in the Ogaden.
37

After the battle of Woina Dega the Portugese influence
in Ethiopia rose for a time and then disappeared entirely:
"Portugese Roman Catholic Missionaries began
to arrive in 1554 in the wake of the closer
ties between the two. countries . Efforts (at
imposing Roman Catholicism) engendered great
bitterness within the Empire as pro and anti
Catholic parties struggled for control of
the state ... after a particularly bloody
battle between adherents of the two faiths
,
the .. .Catholic emperor, Susenyos , abdicated
in favor of his son Fasiladas in 1632... The
expulsion of ... Catholic missionaries followed.
This left a strong hostility to foreign Chris-
tians and Europeans in general that continues
into the twentieth century. It also con-
tributed to the period of isolation that
followed for the next 200 years."
As a result of (1) the Galla migrations; (2) the
Moslem occupation of the coastal regions; (3) the Turks at
Massawa; and (4) the expulsion of the Catholics; by 1540
the central portion of the Horn was sealed off from the
rest of the world. It was to remain so until the end of
the Zemana Mesafint .
During the final days of the Zemana Mesafint incur-
sions by the Egyptians from out the Sudan were portents of
greater conflict to come. Campaigns during 1821, 1832,
1835 and 1844-48 resulted in Egyptian control of Gallabat,
Kasalla, and the approaches to the Eritrean Highlands,
5 3including Massawa.
5 2 Kaplan, et al
.
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The combination of the internal struggles of the
Zemana Mesafint and the threat posed by the Egyptian incur-
sions resulted in renewed ties between Ethiopia and the arms
dealers of the outside world, most notably France and England.
The rise of a shifta leader named Kassa, using imported arms,
started the Horn on it's way into the modern world.
4 . Three Kings- Tewdoros, Johannes and Menelik
Tewdoros (Theodore) was crowned in 1855 after a series
of bloody intrigues and civil wars had effectively eliminated
his opposition. Originally the. son of a petty noble who
became a shifta leader Tewdoros (then called Kassa) was able
to establish his connection to the Solomonid line . He took
his coronation name from another legend which predicted the
rise of a great king named Tewdoros who would unite all the
54peoples of Ethiopia. Tewdoros began to increase trade
with France and England and was the first of Ethiopia's
leaders who appeared to want genuinely to institute reforms
,
particularly in the government and the military. Unfortunately
the resistance of his Rases overcame his efforts at reform
and his increasing insanity caused him to become more and
more tyrannical. By 1860 his power was waning.
54 Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 74.
55 Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia, p. 5 5 4.
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As a result of his own paranoia and an oversight in
the British foreign office, Tewdoros felt he had been snubbed
by Queen Victoria. He imprisoned the British consul and an




The British reacted predictably. A'fter noting that
Tewdoros' army had decreased from over 100,000 to 15,000 and
that the countryside was in revolt against him, they sent
an expeditionary force under General Sir Robert Napier to
5 7
secure the relief of the captives. In January 1858 the
British force landed at Zula, near Massawa. After a march
of three hundred miles , which required three months to com-
plete, the British force met Tewdoros' army (or what was
left of it) on Arrogee plain at the foot of the mountain
fortress of Magdala . The battle began on 10 April 1868 at
four o'clock in the afternoon. By seven o'clock in the
evening the action for Arrogee was over. The last shots
were fired in a rainstorm which had come up in the middle
of the battle. At least 700 Ethiopians were killed and
over 1,200 wounded and left on the field. The British losses
were 2 wounded, of whom two later died. Ethiopian courage
had proved useless against well aimed rifle fire.




57 See Chandler, D. G., "The Expedition to Abyssinia,"
in Victorian Military Campaigns
,
pp. 105-160, by Brian Bond,
(edT^ Praeger Publishers , 196 7, for probably the best account
of this little known but important expedition.
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On the 11th April Tewdoros asked for a 24 hour arm-
istice and agreed to release the captives to Napier. He
also sent some 1,500 sheep and cattle as a gift. The
hostages were accepted but the animals returned -- in
effect a sign of "no quarter." By this time the hostile
Galla tribesmen of the region had surrounded the reverse
slopes of Magdala , effectively sealing off any means of escape
5 8
for the Ethiopians who remained with the insane Emperor.
On 13 April Tewdoros gave permission for any one who wished
to leave and join the protection of Napier's camp. Three
to four hundred fighting men elected to remain with the
Emperor in the fortress of Magdala to the end. The British
assault was relentless and at 9 a.m. Easter Monday, Tewdoros
— Mad King Theodore -- killed himself with a pistol as
5 9
the survivors of his force surrendered to the British.
The victors made no attempt to consolidate or colonize
the Ethiopian Empire. Once Napier had released the captives
he simply marched back to Zula and boarded ship. He did,
however, reward those Ethiopian Rases who had assisted his
efforts. Most notable of these was another Kassa, discussed
58
Ibid., p. 143.
59Nearly every work which mentions Tewdoros cites the
circumstances of his suicide (ironically with a pistol which
was a gift from Queen Victoria). Greenfield, Ethiopia
, pp.
82-84 has the most interesting insight into the impact of
this event on the Ethiopian national psyche.
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below. The major result of the British victory was that it
left the impression that the Horn was ripe for the taking.
An impression that impacted strongly on the Italians as
shall become apparent.
At the death of Tewdoros , Ras Kassa of Tigre became
the most powerful prince in Ethiopia. Napier had made him
a present of 6 mortars, 6 howitzers (with 200 rounds of
ammunition each), 850 muskets and 28 barrels of gunpowered.
Kassa put them to good use and by 1372 was crowned Johannes IV
as Aksum. A personally brave man, he spent most of his
rule at war with the Egyptians , Mahdists and Italians . Ey
1885 he had brought most of northern Ethiopia and Eritrea
under his sway and through a marriage arrangement gained the
support of Menelik of Shoa, the second most powerful man in
the Horn. Thus Johannes was the first Emperor to rule, albeit
briefly and tenuously, an Ethiopia which corresponded roughly
to what it is today. But he did not do so without a
struggle
.
In 1875 Egypt attempted to invade Johannes' realm.
A three-pronged attempt resulted in success in the south
with the Egyptians occupying Harar and Zelia. A column from
Greenfield, Ethiopia
,
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the region of Djibouti (led by a Swiss named Muntzinger) was
destroyed in the Danikil Desert, the third and largest attempt
entered Eritrea from Massawa and was annhilated on the plain
of Gundet with a loss of 1,800 Egyptians killed. Johannes
gained 2,000 modern rifles and some more cannon. Another
attempt in 1876 under an American chief of staff (General
R 9
W. W. Loring) was destroyed at Gura . After 1876 the Egyptians
made no further attempts to disturb the Ethiopians . They
had their hands full with a mystic who had appeared in the
Sudan -- Muhammad Ahmad bin 'Abdallah -- called The Mahdi
.
For a short time Johannes was distracted from events
in the Sudan by the Italians. In 1885 they had replaced the
Turks at Massawa and had begun to move inland. There is
evidence that the British aided and encouraged Italian efforts
in the first of many examples of English duplicity on the
R 3
Horn. The Italians may have expected an easy success like
that of Napier but they were disappointed. Johannes was no
Tewdoros . The Battle of Dogali in 1885 left a column of












p. 91 credits Ras Alula.
the governor of Eritrea with this victory, however there




The coast of Somaliland was occupied by the Italians
in 1888, an event that will be discussed later in this paper.
As a result of Dogali and other clashes the Italians began to
shift forces in order to mass an army in Massawa. In March
of 1888 Johannes responded by poising an army of 100,000 men
C r
for an attack on the town
.
Without the rise of the Mahdi and his successor the
Kalipha Ta'ishi Abdullahi bin Mohammed in the Sudan, the
battle of Adowa might have taken place in 1388. But, in
1887 the Mahdists invaded and burned Gondar, Johannes
'
captial and he saw them as the more immediate threat. It
also must be noted that the British were anxious for the
Ethiopians to relieve pressure on the the Sudanese/Egyptian
Garrisons along the border. They were able to convince
Johannes that he should relieve them and a treaty had been
fi R
signed to that effect on 3 June 1884. At any rate and
for whatever reason the fact remains that Johannes turned
from the Italians at Massawa and marched to meet his doom
R 7
on the zariba at Mettema.
fi R
Woolf, Leonard. Empire and Commerce in Africa
,
p. 165,
Howard Fertig Publishers, 1968.
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The dervish (followers of the Kalipha) had fortified
the position at Gallabat on the edge of Mettema plain. They
had erected an enormous zariba (palisade) and then took up
positions outside the works. At dawn of 10 March 1889 the
Ethiopians met them head on. The attack was successful and
the zariba set afire and penetrated. The Ethiopians were
inside beginning to loot when the word was passed that
Johannes and been wounded and taken from the field.
Much as the armies of Ahmed Gragn had done, the Ethiopian
army simply melted from the field and started home. Johannes
died the next day during the retreat. The dervish pursued
the retreating Ethiopians to the foot of the highlands but
could not follow up their victory. This battle had an
impact beyond that on Ethiopia. As Churchill put it:
"The flower of the Dervish army, the heroic
blacks of Abu Anga, were almost destroyed.
The Kalifa had won a Pyrrhic triumph. Never
again was he able to put so great a force in
the field, and although the army that was
shattered at Omdurman was better armed and
better drilled, it was less formidable than
that which broke the might of Abyssinia." 69
The Italians took advantage of the respite to occupy
portions of Eritrea and by the end of 1890 were safely en-
camped both to the north and to the south of Ethiopia. They
now had a firm foothold on the Horn. Johannes' death opened
the way for Menelik of Shoa to claim the throne that Johannes
R R








had promised him. Unfortunately, Johannes had reneged on
the promise and on his death-bed named his son Ras Mangasha
as his successor.
During Johannes' reign Menelik had occupied himself
with expanding his own 'kingdom of Shoa to the south. He had
also opened up trade on his own with French and British arms
merchants via Djibouti. He now concentrated his efforts on
subduing the recalcitrant northern Rases to his will. He
entered into agreement with the Italians which resulted in
the closure of the arms trade through Eritrean ports. Deprived
of the supplies needed to conduct the war, the rebellious
Rases were subjugated and Menelik was crowned Negus Negast
(the King of Kings). Thus, the center of the Empire shifted
to the south once more, from Tigre-Eritrea to Shoa, an event
which rankles some northerners to this day.
Menelik' s influence on the Horn is enormous.
According to Richard Greenfield:
"In its extent, its government and its problems,
present day Ethiopia is largely the creation of
the Emperor Menelik II. The process dating from
long before his assumption of the imperial crown,
began as the expansion of the southerly kingdom,
now province, of Shewa (sic), of which he was
negus .. .Interpretations of Menelik' s expansionist
policy vary widely. Not only are they something
of a political issue, for the Somali Republic
views Menelik II as a participator in the 'Scramble
70Greenfield, Ethiopia, p. 95.
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for Africa', but scholars also disagree. The
author inclines to the view that Menelik was
motivated in part by a desire to occupy as
many areas as possible before they were seized
by the imperialist powers of Europe and his
actions were , therefore , to some extent a re-
sponse to the 'Scramble for Africa' . . .However
the fact remains that between 1872 and 1896
the territory which Menelik ruled was more
than doubled in area."
In return for Italy's assistance, Menelik signed the
famous Treaty of Ucciali, which in effect granted the Italians
the right to colonize Eritrea. The treaty formed the basis
for the Italio-Ethiopian War of 189 6:
"...(the treaty) stated, in its Amharic ver-
sion, that the Emperor might avail himself
of the Italian Government in his relations
with foreign states, whereas the Italian
text stipulated that he shall do so. Italy
thus had become , in effect , the protecting
power of the whole of Ethiopia and had in-
formed other governments accordingly. When
Menelik heard of this interpretation., .his
relations with Italy became vitiated and
tense .
"
On 18 January 189 6 the Italians demanded the imme-
diate annexation of a large part of Tigre province to their
colony of Eritrea. A battalion of troops marched into
Tigre to take possession. They got as far as Makelle where
73they were destroyed to the last man. This small engagement
had the impact of a "Custers last stand" on the Italians and
created a furor which resulted in demands that the governor
71
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of the colony be removed. The Ethiopians began to mass to
the sound of the negaret (war drum) and marched toward the
border demarcated by the Mareb River. General Barateri,
faced with the need for a victory to ensure the governors
job, gambled the lives of 14,000 of his soldiers -- and lost.
The two forces met at a town called Adowa and the battle
they fought there has been called the "most important battle
74
ever fought on the continent of Afrxca."
Poor generalship, faulty intelligence and plain
foolishness led to an utter disaster for Italian arms.
Overwhelmed by 140,000 Ethiopian warriors, the Italian force
was literally destroyed. Of the 10,596 Italians involved
in the fighting 6,000 were killed, 2,000 wounded, and 2,000
taken prisoner. None of the 4,00 Erit.rean levies escaped
either all having been killed or mutilated after being
captured.
The disaster could have been worse had Menelik pur-
sued the retreating Italians. Menelik did not follow up on
his advantage, nor did he attempt to seize Eritrea. Instead,
the Treaty of Addis Ababa left Eritrea in Italian hands
.
74
Dugan, James and Lafore , Laurence, Days of Emperor and
Clown, p. 10, Doubleday and Co., 19 73. They also say of Adowa
— "(it was) the most important battle — next to Sedan... in
which any European army took part in the nineteenth century."
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George Baer advances the theory that Menelik wanted to use
the Italian threat to increase national unity and the loyalty
7 fi
of the Rases to his throne. Others feel that his troops
were not disciplined enough to engage in a pursuit, however
badly beaten the enemy was. The why of the matter is
immaterial. The fact that the Italians remained in
Eritrea became a matter of terrible importance in the years
ahead.
The Battle of Adowaput Ethiopia on the map and
attracted the attention of the world. Menelik' s new capital,
Addis Ababa, was thriving with legations and ambassadors.
The French came with economic interests and began the Franco-
Ethiopian Railway (still Ethiopia's main artery to the sea),
the British were not far behind. The Italians began to plot.
The "Adowa Complex" as the rankling of the Italian
defeat became known, and the desire to expand their colonial
possessions came to dominate the Italian political psyche.
In 1906 the British and French joined them in signing a
document which outlined "spheres of influence" in Ethiopia.
This was, in effect, a plan for the colonization of Ethiopia
77
on the death of Menelik. The significance of the act was
the recognition of the colonial importance of Ethiopia to
7 fi
Baer, George, The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War .
p. 5, Harvard University Press, 1967.
77
Barker, The Civilizing Mission, p. 25.
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Italy. Menelik died in 1913 but Ethiopia was saved by
World War I -- Europe was too embroiled in her own war with
no time or troops to spare, otherwise there is little doubt
that Ethiopia would have been split up and occupied by the
colonial powers
.
This review of events prior to 1900 supports beginning
an analysis of the modern history of the Horn of Africa with
the following givens
:
1. Prior to Tewdoros, Johannes and Menlik the peoples
of the Horn were relatively "a territorial," as Bohannon
and Curtin define it:
"...(the) community was and is built fun-
damentally on relationships within social
groups based on some principle other than
'economies'; that community is set into
space, by other than associations of 'own-
ership' as we recognize it, and exploits
the space around it."
2. No firm nationalistic ideas had been inculcated into
the peoples of the Horn. There is no mention of Eritrean
secessionism, Somali irridentism, or even Ethiopian nationalism,
although the latter began to surface about the time of Menelik.
3. Prior to the death of Menelik, the Horn of Africa
was characterized by primordialism of the classic type as
identified by Geertz:
7 8
Bohannon, Paul and Curtin, Phillip, Africa and Africans
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"(Primordial attachment is)... being born into
a particular religious community, speaking a
particular language, or even a dialect of a
language, and following particular social
practices. These congruities of blood,
speech, custom, and so on, are seen to
have an ineffable, and at times over-
powering, coerciveness in and of themselves.
One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor,
one's fellow believer, ipso facto ; as the
result not merely of personal affection,
practical necessity, common interest, or
incurred obligation, but at least in great
part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute
import attributed to the very tie itself."
These attributes were to undergo rapid and far reaching
change as the result of an "X" factor -- "The Scramble for
Africa." The power of modern technology and the intrusion
of external power, most notably the Italians, into the
region made it possible for Menelik to be a successful
participant in the "scramble." As a result, present day
political geography on the Horn is a function of the shifting
borders of Ethiopia, and the stuff of legend, history, and
tradition play a large role in the problems extant there today
79 Geertz, Clifford (ed)
,
Old Societies and New States
,
p. 109, Free Press of Glencoe , 1963.
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III. THE MODERN BACKDROP
A. POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY
The impact of the "scramble for Africa," including
Menelik's participation, resulted in the demarcation of
boundaries and spheres of influence on the Horn. It can,
and has been, argued that since Menelik's time the pattern
of alliances and the nature of conflict in the region have
had some basis in the "nationalistic" aspirations of the
states inhabiting these disputed boundaries
.
Virtually all of the boundaries in the Horn were estab-
lished during or just after Menelik's reign and so it is
appropriate at this point to examine the political geography
of the Horn as it existed at that time . Ethiopia is central
to the Horn and as a result shares borders with all of the
regional actors. It is from this Ethiopian perspective that
the political geography is most clearly perceived.
As discussed in the previous chapter the Ethiopian heart-
land shifted from Tigre-Eritrea to Lasta, Gondar and finally
to Shoa as a result of the pressures of Islam and Menelik's
preoccupation with the southern regions. The Italian occupa-
tion of Eritrea and the treaty of Addis Ababa, after Adowa
,
resulted in a formalized border running roughly along the
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present provincial boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
This demarcation strengthened the sense of separate identity
8
already felt by the Eritreans
.
In Somalia the British first established a protectorate
in 1884, and by 1887 they had declared the establishment of
British Somaliland. The Italians concluded formal treaties
with the Somali Sultans as well. They began to expand inland
across the coastal belt into the Somali Plateau. By 1905 the
area was known as Italian Somaliland.
The British and Italians agreed upon borders between their
respective Somalilands and also the Somaliland-Kenya border
in 1891. The latter was further revised in favor of the
Italians in order to obtain Italy's withdrawal from the
central powers in World War I. Formal recognition of the
8
1
border came about in 1925.
The border between Ethiopia and the two Somalilands was
established in the same manner in 1894, i.e. agreement between
the British and Italians without consultation with either the
Somalis or Ethiopians , both of whom were to challenge the
boundaries. In 1908 Ethiopia and Italy agreed upon a new
demarcation of the border between Ethiopia and Italian
8 n See Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia
,
p. 24,
for a discussion of the Treaty of Addis Ababa.
8
1
Henderson, Robert E., "The Horn of Africa," The
Washington Review
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Somaliland. The only two maps showing the new boundary were
subsequently lost and the border has been in dispute ever
82
since .
The modern boundary between Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti
was established peacefully by the French in 189 7 and has
Q Q
remained stable since that time
.
The frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan was established
in 1902. This border, the longest common border in Africa,
has been the scene of serious tensions . Although mutually
recognized, both parties have historically been troubled by
84hostile groups operating from sanctuary in the other country.
The border with Kenya was demarcated in colonial times but
was not recognized until 1963. This border is also contested
by the Somalis who claim a portion of Northwest Kenya as
8 5Somali territory.
With Ethiopia surrounded by hostile or colonizing powers
for the second time in her history, and considering the
desire of those powers to reap the benefit of additional col-
onies, (as well as avenging a shameful defeat in the case of
the Italians), it is not surprising that conflict would con-
tinue to characterize the Horn. The only surprise is that
it took as long as it did to return.
82




And will probably remain so as long as French troops
remain in Djibouti.
84
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B. THE ITALIAN IMPACT
1 . Ethiopia
On the death of Menelik, Ethiopia was racked by civil
war and disorder. During this period of turmoil his desig-
nated successor, Li
j
(Prince) Eyasu, embraced Islam and
8 R
declared Ethiopia to be in the sphere of the Ottoman Empire.
The Shoan nobles proclaimed Zauditu, Menelik' s daughter,
Empress and Ras Tafari Makonnen regent and heir presumptive.
Lij Eyasu was excommunicated from the Church and, after a
brief civil disturbance, his supporters were overpowered by
the forces of the Empress. The muslim Negus died in prison
in 1935. 87
Ras Tafari Makonnen began to build his own forces
and milked his province of Harar for revenues until he was
in a position to make a bid for control of the government.
The death of the aged foreign minister, Fitwary Habta Giorgis
,
provided him the opportunity he needed. He moved his forces
from Harar to Addis Ababa and assumed command of the army,
and therefore, the government. In 19 2 8 he was crowned Negus
and was exercising direct rule while the Empress by now was
reduced to a mere figurehead. The takeover was not without
bloodshed. The old Empress attempted to rally her followers,
the foremost of which was Ras Gugsa Wolie of Gondar . Tafari '
s
O c
See Jones and Monroe, A History of Ethiopia
,
pp. 155-







army destroyed his forces on 31 March 19 30. The next day the
Empress Zauditu died of uncertain causes . Immediately after
a period of mourning Ras Tafari Makonnen became Hailie
8 8
Selassie I, Negus Negast .
The new Emperor's ambition was the modernization of
his Empire. Yet, due to the recalcitrance of his Rases
,
which in Go jam and Tigre actually led to revolt, much of
his time was spent in consolidating power and coopting his
opposition largely through gaining the support of the church.
His most significant achievements during this first five years
as emperor were (1) the first constitution; (2) the develop-
ment of a bureaucracy; (3) the abolition of slavery; (4)
the beginnings of a modernization of the army; and, perhaps
most important, (5) the beginnings of an educated class of
r ,, . • . 89Ethiopian.
All was not well however, for if it seemed that
Hailie Sellassie had a firm hand on the rudder of state in
19 35, others were casting covetous eyes on the helm. The
interests of the great powers, particularly Italy, had been
diverted (but not ended) by World War I. In fact, Italy
began to court Ethiopia — on the surface. Ethiopia's entry
to the League of Nations was supported by Italy and a treaty
See Greenfield, Ethiopia
, pp. 147-164 for a lucid
account of Hailie Selassie's rise to power.
89
The first years of the new Emperor are summarized in
excellent fashion by Markakis , John, Ethiopia: Anatomy of a
Traditional Policy
, pp. 201-204, Clarendon Press, 1974.
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of friendship was signed in 1923 and again in 1928. These
apparently friendly acts were designed to achieve the eco-
nomic and political penetration of Ethiopia. Angelo Del Boca
in his book, The Ethiopian War, says clearly that the Italians
9had begun planning the invasion as early as 1925.
Not until 1934 however, did the right set of circum-
stances arise. While it is not within the limits of this
paper to examine those events in detail it is sufficient to
know that on 5 December 19 34 a skirmish at a place called
Wal-Wal is said by some to have been the opening round of
World War II. Fighting which broke out between an Italian
garrison squatting deep inside Ethiopian territory and an
Ethiopian force which was escorting aboundary commission,
left over 130 Somali and Ethiopian soldiers dead around the
91
wells at Wal-Wal. Both countries lodged immediate com-
plaints with the League of Nations. But the League procras-
tinated while the British and French hesitated (they were
afraid of driving Italy into the arms of Hitler's Germany).
The Ethiopians placed their trust in the Emperor who in turn
placed his faith in the League of Nations . In the meantime
the Italians began to build up forces in Somalia and Eritrea.
90
Del Boca, Angelo, The Ethiopian War
,
1935-41, p. 9,
University of Chicago Press, 1969.
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Baer's detailed and scholarly book, The Coming of the
Italian-Ethiopian War is without a doubt the definitive study
of* the events leading up to the war. On page 54 he cites the
losses at Wal-Wal as Somali - 30 dead, 100 wounded. Ethiopian
- 107 dead, 45 wounded.
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On 3 October 1935, the Italian forces crossed the
Ethiopian/Eritrean frontier. The attack was initially con-
ventional in nature and well-disciplined. With the appoint-
ment of Marshal Badoglio in Eritrea in November and Marshal
Graziani (who will be discussed later) in the Ogaden , the
character of the war changed. The use of poison gas and the
execution of prisoners , both male and female , was commonplace
.
Open towns, hospitals, churches, and most everything else
Ethiopian were bombed and shelled relentlessly. Although
the Emperor's forces resisted stubbornly at first, they simply
could not compete with the well-equipped and well-trained
Italian forces
.
The war will not be examined in detail, but one phe-
nomenon must be mentioned. After major defeats at Tembien,
Shire and Dhagabur and during the final major defeat at
Mai-Chew, large numbers of Tigre, Galla and other ethnic
9?
minorities deserted the Emperor and went over to the Italians .
The outcome of the war can be condensed into one sentence
.
The Ethiopians were defeated by invading columns from Eritrea
and Somalia, both of which included large numbers of Eritreans
,
Somalis and other ethnic groups whose attitudes toward the
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As Addis Ababa was occupied, the Emperor fled into
exile in England, and on 9 May 1936 Ethiopia was proclaimed
9 3
a part of the Italian Empxre . Events in Europe and the
stirrings of World War II then captured the attention of the
world and from 1936 to 1941 the Italians were unchecked in
the Horn.
Italy's new constitution for "Italian East Africa"
brought Ethiopia, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea together
with the whole divided into six provinces. Political power
was in the hands of the Italian army and the Fascist Party
who exercised it through their surrogate Somalis , Eritreans
and occasionally Ethiopians. Mussolini recognized that
years would be required before Ethiopia could make a return
on capital invested in her, but there were many people willing
to take the gamble
.
According to Ernest Luther, Italian investment in
road construction alone was in excess of $300 million and
the rise in imports to support construction programs was
a spectacular 3,000 percent. He also states that an equiv-
alent amount ($300 million) was spent on development of
. . 94telegraph and telephone systems and hydroelectric facilities.
From 1937 to 1940 over 300,000 settlers and entrepreneurs
emigrated to Ethiopia. According to Italian government
93




Luther, Ethiopia Today, passim.
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figures (as furnished to Del Boca) there ware 936 profes-
sional men, 540 agricultural concessionaries, and over
4,000 "industrialists" and shopkeepers in this group. Total
private investment was in excess of three billion lire at
a time when the average weekly wage in Italy was 4 5 lire.
During the five year occupation 5,000 kilometers of road,
25 hospitals (only one existed before the war), schools,
municipal buildings, bridges and prisons were constructed.
In order to facilitate this program of construction, addi-
tional improvements were made in the harbors at Massawa and
Assab and aviation facilities were built as well. Agricultural
innovations and equipment were introduced in those areas
firmly under Italian control and improvements in output
9 5
were rapid in coming. Nearly every work on Ethiopia
dealing with this period comments on the tremendous invest-
ment made by the Italians in Ethiopia and on the rapid con-
struction of an infrastructure that would have taken the
Ethiopian government many years to create, if at all. It is
generally overlooked that all this work was not done out of
a desire to improve the lot of the Ethiopian, but rather to
compliment the exploitation of the country. It was Italian
development, not Ethiopian development. The fact that the
95 Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, passim,
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work done by the Italians was to prove of great value in
later modernization schemes does not excuse exploitation
nor compensate for the calculated terror of the occupation.
Although the Italians declared Ethiopia under their
control in 1936 at no time did they govern the entire
96
countryside. The policy of "all rebels captured are to
be shot" and the energy with which it was implemented
generated resistance groups which called themselves Arbannoch
(patriots). Many of the arbannoch leaders were captured
and executed but a number of them survived to be rewarded
97
with positions of authority in the new Empire after the war.
Of more sinister character was the calculated attempt
on the part of the Italians to liquidate whole influence
groups. This policy of selective extermination had it's
roots in an assissination attempt on Marshal Graziani, the
King of Italy's Viceroy in Ethiopia. Although the attempt
failed, a series of reprisals was made -- estimates of the
victims of those reprisals run as high as 30,000 persons in
a three day massacre in Addis Ababa alone, the lowest esti-
mate evidenced was 1,400. Graziani became obsessed with
hatred and saw enemies everywhere. Unable to trace his would
be assassins he took advantage of the opportunity to liquidate





, pp. 220-248 for an excellent
account of the activities of the Arbannoch during the occupation
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the entire Ethiopian intelligencia , every member of the Young
Ethiopian Party, and all officers and cadets of the Military
Academy. He also ordered the execution of large numbers of
clergy -- at Debra Libanos alone over 300 monks and priests
98 .
were shot out of hand. Graziam's own words best illustrate
the cold-bloodedness of the Italian policy in Ethiopia as
contrasted with their begnin approach in Eritrea and Somalia.
"Extermination of all Amhara chiefs, great
and small must be speeded up, for if this
is not done we can only expect further trouble
.
As well as chiefs all Amhara military com-
manders and officials must be executed -- none
to be spared out of feelings of false pity."
Perhaps his most famous public statement:
"The Duce shall have Ethiopia, with or with-
out the Ethiopians, just as he pleases."
Finally even Mussolini realized that events were out
of control and in November 19 37 Graziani was replaced by the
Duke of Aosta, a cultured and humane man, but the damage had
been done and the Duke faced increasing resistance . The
people had become convinced that the Italians meant to ex-
terminate them. This fear was reinforced by the seemingly
insane attacks on the church. In fact, these attacks were
part of a coldly calculated plan whereby the Italians were
98
Every historian interested in the events of these times,
be he Italian, Ethiopian, or other, has his own "favorite" horror
story about the reprisals and liquidations . They differ only in
numbers of dead, the events are agreed to by all.
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attempting to widen ethnic and religious cleavages (men-
tioned earlier) in a sort of "divide and rule" policy. Their
actions were designed to favor the predominant Galla and Moslem
groups at the expense of the Amhara and Christian. A result
of this persecution was a drawing together of the Christian
Amhara and some members of other ethnic groups into a hardened
resistance which had the blessing and support of the church.
To counter this resistance the Italians formed a "Black Army"
of Tigre , Eritrean and Somali troops and upon their deployment
a climate of civil war was created which further widened the
cleavages
.
In 1941 the Emperor with British and Commonwealth
assistance was returned to Addis Ababa and the Italian pre-
sence destroyed in fairly heavy fighting. ~ It was the
intention of British forces to impose a mandate over the
entire Horn of Africa. The Emperor, largely through per-
sonal audacity and the help of Churchill, was able to thwart
the desires of the field commanders as far as Ethiopia proper
was concerned. The British did, however, retain control of
the Haud and Ogaden regions, as well as the former Italian
colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.
For the definitive account of the liberation of the
Horn see Playfair, Maj . Gen. I.S.O., The Mediterranean and




After the defeat of Italian imperialism at Adowa the
Italians began to build up their colony in Eritrea. As
Trevaskis puts it:
"Eritrea was created, and so named, by the
Italians. No concession was made to... past
history or the racial-and cultural complexion
of its inhabitants.
The Italian regime in Eritrea was not oppressive,
although they tended to support the Moslem elements of the
population at the expense of the Christians. Development
policies were similar to those the Italians were to follow
in Ethiopia. However, the Eritrean reaped some immediate
benefit from the developmental efforts of the Italians.
In Ethiopia, the Italians brought in Eritreans and Somalis
to help them operate the colony. In Eritrea there were no
"middle men." From a physical point of view the Italians
brought roads , bridges , and a railway was built from Agordat
to Massawa. The port of Massawa itself was modernized,
becoming competitive with any port in Africa. Animal and
human diseases were attacked and controlled, if not eliminated
A city, Asmara, was built as a replica of an Italian town












significance, the Italians brought a legal system. Mo longer
subject to arbitrary whims of the Rases and Neguses the
people under Italian direction formed a rudimentary admin-
istrative apparatus and government
.
Large numbers of Eritreans died in the Battle of
Adowa and many more were to fall in later battles . The
Italians made serious attempts to prepare the Eritreans
to follow their Italian leaders into battle against the
104Ethiopians in 1935. Old rivalries between Shoan and
Tigrynian claims to the throne were revived an intensifica-
tion of the anti-Christian attitudes on the part of Islamic
elements of the population were undertaken.
During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia proper,
Eritrea became a "most favored province" along with Somalia,
and did not suffer the reprisals nor the privations that the
rest of the country had to endure. In fact, Italian colonial
policy tended to reinforce the sense of superiority felt
by many Eritreans
.
The real significance of Italian colonial rule in
Eritrea, both before and during the war, was the isolation
of the area from its former contacts and the creation of a
new society. (It also inculcated a separate identity in
the minds of the population -- Eritrean.) Once again
Trevaskis probably says it best:
104 oSee page 49 above for Eritrean losses. Del Boca,
The Ethiopian War devotes a good part of chapter 2 to dis-
cussing Italian preparation for the war.
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"Italy created Eritrea... by severing its dif-
ferent peoples from those with whom their
past had been linked and by grafting the am-
putated remnants to each other under the title
of Eritrean." 105
3 . Somalia
In Somalia prior to the arrival of the Italians and
British there had never been an institutionalized government
Tribal resistance began almost immediately in those areas
where the population came into contact with the colonizers
.
The Italians practiced the old game of playing one clan off
against another and also took advantage of such religious
cleavages as existed. The British followed their normal
pattern of indirect rule and did not impact seriously on
the Somali culture
.
A religious revival gave rise to the second of
Somalia's great heros during the early years. The "Mad
Mullah" -- Mohammed Ibn Abdullah Hassan -- fought against
the British, Italians, Ethiopians and any Somali who was
not of his religious order. The rebellion lasted twenty-one
years and required the combined efforts of Britain, Italy
and Ethiopia to put down. Yet, they never completely sup-
pressed the Mullah's followers and today the Mullah ranks
with Ahmed Gragn as one of the leading figures in Somali
nationalist thought. His memory surely lives today in the
ongoing attempts to regain the lost territory and in the
Moslem ethic of the Somali. Douglas Jardine writes:
Trevaskis, Eritrea, p. 10
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"Intensely as the Somalis feared and loathed
the man whose followers had looted their stock,
robbed them of their all, raped their wives, and
murdered their children, they could not but ad-
mire and respect one who, being the embodiment of
their idea of Freedom and Liberty, never admitted
allegiance to any man, Moslem or infidel."
The Mullah is the symbol of Somali nationalism.
On nationalism Saadia Touval says:
"Somali nationalism stems from a feeling of
national conciousness in the sense of 'we'
as opposed to 'they' which has existed among
the Somalis for many centuries."
The Italians simply directed this feeling into a
political vein as evidenced by a telegram from Marshal
Graziani to Mussolini in 1936:
"Idea of 'Greater Somalia' under Italian
rule now established in minds of all Somalis
,
even primitive woodland dwellers now convinced
of superiority of Somalis over Ethiopians."
It is not intended to imply that the Italians in Italian
Somaliland, and during the war years in British Somaliland,
simply threw a switch and produced irridentism. However,
in large measure it was culture contact which reoriented
Somali nationalism, as described by Touval, toward the
relationship of land for the state rather than the people of
the nation. The fact that the Ogaden and all other lands
i n fi
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Del Boca, The Ethiopian War, p. 26.
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claimed by the Somalis were retained under British and
later Italian trusteeship did nothing to dispel that idea
of "Greater Somiali." 109
When cultures meet and synthesize there are obviously
a myriad of factors and aspects which must be considered
capable of influencing the outcome . Given the complexity
of the situation on the Horn many of the factors which may
be considered important -- even crucial -- may have been
omitted. But, as with any other situation, the impact of
the Italians on the Horn is a matter of perspective -- i.e.
from where one views the situation so that what is beneficial
from one point of view can be a disaster from another. The
significance of the Italian influence appears to be profound
in three areas
:




The consequences of the reprisals and executions
during the occupation.
3 The exacerbation of existing cleavages in Eritrea
and Somalia and the subsequent foundation for the twin dis-
putes which trouble the Horn today.
109
The British remained in Eritrea until 1952, the
Ogaden until 1955, 1960 in Kenya and British Somaliland.
The Italians left Somaliland in 1960 as well.
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The tremendous capital investment that Italy made in what
hoped to be her future empire has been discussed -- an
empire of demographic colonization, with a million Italians
settled on it's most fertile land. Of course the liberation
of the country by the allies saw much of the infrastructure
destroyed or damaged. Even so, it is indisputable that
much of the development survived the war and provided the
Emperor with a head start on modernization. The exposure
of the populace to modern agricultural techniques also would
prove to be advantageous to the Emperor's modernization plans.
For the first time many Ethiopians began to understand the
need to move into the modern world in some sectors of life
in order to compete as an independent nation. The impact
of this aspect of Italian influence was especially hard
hitting in Eritrea, which experienced it the longest and
had acquired the most extensive infrastructure.
The reprisals and executions had tremendous impact on
Ethiopian society and development as well, though oddly in
both an advantageous and, at the same time, debilitating and
disruptive way.
On the plus side, the systematic elimination of the
Amhara nobility destroyed the traditional feudal hierarchy
that existed before the war. Many of the Rases who opposed
the Emperor's desires were gone. Concurrently with the
downfall of the old Rases a new group of nobility rose from
the patriot forces of the Arbannoch
.
Not quite as conservative
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as the old Rases but not quite as radical as the students
who followed them, nevertheless a strong and respected group
which made the Emperor's task after the war easier than it
might have been. For example, the establishment of a national
army, central control of policy and justice, public health,
etc. -- all would have been opposed by the old Rases as being
threats to their power. Admittedly these innovations may not
have been as effective or efficient as possible because they
have not roots in the society, but it is a fact that the
Italians plowed the ground for the planting of the seeds from
which many of the institutions have taken root.
On the negative side, the execution of the cream of Ethiopia's
educated youth was a tragedy in more ways than one . Prac-
tically every educated man was shot in 1937. A generation
of potential leaders was destroyed. In 19 74, that generation
might have provided that line of communication between the
older generation and the students clamoring for change
.
They might have been the Colonels who had the respect and
confidence of the junior officers . They might have been
the advisors who could have helped the Emperor meet the
expectations of his people. Sadly, no one knows what might
have been.
The pro-Moslem, anti-Amhara stance adopted by the Italians
in Eritrea and Somalia from the beginning, and later adopted
during the occupation of Ethiopia had far reaching effects.
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The treatment of Eritrea and Somalia as favored provinces
during the occupation further widen cleavages. But it
was the ideas of autonomy and economic advantage which
lured the Eritreans and Somalis into supporting the Italians
Neither Somalia nor Eritrea suffered the devastation of the
campaign or the reprisals of Graziani. The promise of
"Greater Somalia" and independent Eritrea was the concept
which reoriented the thinking of the inhabitants toward
specific territory (ies) and contributed most to the
conflict which exists today.
73

IV. NATIONLESS STATES AND STATELESS NATIONS
It can be asserted that the cultural contact between
the Italian and the peoples of the Horn resulted in both
a widening of ethno-polit ical cleavages and the destruction
of Menelik's efforts to form a natural economic unit on the
Horn of Africa. The concepts of nationalism and territo-
riality can be traced to the early Italian colonial influences
while the importation of European mores and technology created
a situation of rising expectation and relative deprivation





The effect of additional external actors on the scene
as a result of World War II was paradoxical. On the one
hand the international legitimacy gained by Hailie Selassie
I, and his ultimate recognition as the primus inter pares
among African heads of state, tended to enhance his control
and provide him with the means to implement his modernization
program. On the other hand, British, Italian and United
Nations acquiescence in the resolution of the Ogaden, Haud
,
and Eritrean questions created a second level colonization
on the Horn.
See Gurr, Ted J., Why Men Rebel
,
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1 . An International Actor
On 31 January 1942 the first Anglo-Ethiopian agree-
ment after the liberation of Ethiopia stated "Ethiopia is
now a free and independent state." However, the area of
the Ogaden and the former colony of Eritrea, as well as
British and Italian Somaliland, were held in trust by the
British until after the war. Many of the ideas regarding
nationalism and irridentism implanted by the Italians were
to germinate under British rule.
After the war Hailie Selassie was faced with wide
spread unrest and rebellion in the countryside. Some of the
rebels were motivated by a desire to form their own petty
kingdoms, others were simply bandits, but a significant
few were questioning the right of Hailie Selassie to rule.
In their eyes he had abandoned Ethiopia. By not following
the example of Menelik's victory over the Italians, and worse
yet, not dying in defeat as did Tewdoros and Johannes, he
had forfeited his right to the throne.
By conquest and cooptation the Emperor emerged vic-
torious over the majority of the dissidents. By the early
1950' s he was once again firmly in control. His main strengths
See Greenfield, Ethiopia
, pp. 270-312 for an exceptional
narrative of what the author calls "Two Decades of Intrigue"
immediately after World War II.
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and at the same time his greatest weaknesses were a powerful
monarchy, which rested on a tradition deeply rooted in a
national church, and Ethiopia's ethnic diversity, with its
deep social cleavages. Supported by a large, relatively
democratic army and surrounded by nobles and bureaucrats who
were personally obligated to the monarch for their status,
the Emperor was committed to a process of modernization --
but only insofar as it enhanced his own personal power and
112prestige. Much of the wherewithal to conduct his modern-
ization programs came from the West, and like Ataturk he
saw his country's destiny in that direction.
In 1951 the United States replaced Britain as Ethiopias
principal supplier of arms and training, and a large aid
program was established. A Military Advisory and Assistance
Group (MAAG) was established in Addi Ababa in 1952. The
quid pro quo for the assitance was twofold -- first, parti-
cipation in the Korean Conflict, and second, the establishment
113
of a communications center. The Emperor's response to the
former was to send troops in support of the United Nations
resolution towards Korea.
From 1951 to 1954 the Kagnew Battalion was attached
to an American Infantry division in Korea. Over the course
of the war more than 5,000 officers and men of the Imperial
112
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Bodyguard served in action against the North Koreans and
Chinese. The army had finally become "modern" and the
114
Bodyguard's record in Korea was admirable.
The U.S. Communications Center at Kagnew Station
near Eritrea's capital city of Asmara was a highly classified
facility operated by the U.S. Army. It's mission was to serve
as a communications relay station to the Middle East and
Indian Ocean and to act as a listening post in the same
regions. With the advent of satellite technology, the post
became less important and shrank from a maximum of about
1,000 personnel to one officer and six enlisted men at the
time that it was closed.
Using the reputation he was getting from his Korea
venture Hailie Selassie felt that as the head of the "oldest
independent nation in Africa" he could become the international
spokesman for the continent
.
"Eager for active participation in African
affairs (in a quest for international stature)
the Emperor abandoned the earlier policy of
remaining aloof from Negro Africa, from which
Ethiopia's Amhara-Tigre elite is separated
by ethnic and religious differences."
Ethiopian representatives participated in the Bandung Con-
ference and the 1958 Accra Conference of Independent African
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Africa was established in Addis Ababa. And as his crowning
achievement, the Emperor was instrumental in the establish-
117
ment of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.
Kaplan views the results of this policy as beneficial:
"The Emperor's establishment of Ethiopia
as a major leader of intra-African movements
gained him added prestige at home, making
him less vulnerable to modernist critics
and more attractive to traditionalists who .. , „
feel he has confirmed Ethiopian superiority."
Be that as it may, it also contributed to rising feelings of
hostility toward an Emperor who was a "world leader" but was
unable to satisfy his own people.
2 . The First Coup
In December 1960, with the Emperor in Brazil, the
commander of the Imperial Bodyguard, and his brother, the
governor of JigJiga attempted to lead some dissatisfied
Amaharas in a coup d'etat to depose the Emperor and install
a "progressive" regime. Though it only lasted three days,
it resulted in the deaths of over 2,000 persons including
a number of the Emperor's relatives and closest advisors.
The Regular Army, acting on the Emperor's orders, was able
to crush the revolt and the ringleaders either committed
suicide or were hanged. Greenfield and Lefever sum up the
coup and its impact thusly:
117
Ibid., passim., chapter 13.
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Kaplan et al, Area Handbook for Ethiopia, pp. 3 7-30.'
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"It may be said that in late 1960 and early
1961 Africa's winds of change blew across the
High Plateau of Ethiopia bringing a new polit-
ical awakening . "
"Why did the top officers of the Emperor's
elite Bodyguard ...turn against him? The
answer lies ironically in the very quality
and cohesion he deliberately sought in the
Bodyguard, and to a considerable extent
achieved. The exalted position of its
officers, reinforced by their continuing
Western contacts
,
gave them leverage for
influence and latitude for discontent .
The regular army and the air force were
quick to ... publicly demand better way.
...a delegation of army officers and men
marched on the Imperial Palace... to demand
a salary increase . When they reminded the
Emperor that they had saved his throne, he
had little choice and granted all enlisted
men an increase in pay... These successful
efforts were followed by continuing and
insistant requests for more modern equip-
ment and more foreign training that would
result in greater efficiency and enhanced
prestige for the armed services. (They)
never encroached upon the political sphere
or implied the need for any basic change
in the economic or political system."
But the time would come when they would. The Emperor's
control after the coup attempt was still strong. He demon-
strated this strength by making no move to recall the 2,500
Bodyguard troops on duty with United Nations Peacekeeping
Forces stationed in the Congo. Once again the Emperor had
traded a contribution of manpower for international
121prestige. The troops were to remaxn until 1964,
119 Greenfield, Ethiopia
,
p. 452. Greenfields entire book
leads up to the attempted coup by the Neway brothers and is
considered the best available on the topic of the 1960 coup.









Concurrently, the Emperor was dealing effectively,
if "not with spectacular success, with the threat of war
with Somalia in the south and the Eritrean "rebellion" in
the north. The Eritrean situation was, and is, critical to
Ethiopia. (The Emperor saw the danger in Ethiopia's total
dependence on the rail link to Djibouti and the Red Sea.)
The only other ports available, Assab and Massawa, lie in
12 2Eritrea. The events leading up to the absorption of
Eritrea by Ethiopia will be dealt with in a subsequent
section. Suffice it to say that an immediate Eritrean
resistance to Ethiopian rule took the form of armed struggle
.
For the next thirteen years the Emperor, though unable to
quell the rebellion, was able to maintain a degree of control
in the area. The present government has not been quite as
successful, as shall be seen.
The situation in the Ogaden region was not much
better. The Somali nationalism fostered by the Italians
had taken root. The Somalis were trying to force their
claims to the Ogaden and the Kenyan Northern Frontier
District. After a series of bloody border clashes in 1960,
'64, and '67 in which the Ethiopians were victorious, the
123
conflict simmered down.
122 Kaplan et al, Area Handbook for Ethiopia, p. 6 5..
123The Somali-Ethiopian dispute will be discussed at
length in the Secion on Somalia, below.
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3 . The Revolution
By 19 74 Ethiopia had become a powder keg ready to
explode in any direction. As it turned out it was the armed
forces that proved to be the match. The Ethiopian Armed
Forces had become the most widely traveled and politically
sophisticated group in the country. As a result of their
service abroad and attendance at (primarily western) military
schools they had become increasingly disenchanted with the
apparent uncaring and, to them at least, limited pace of
modernization
.
In February 1974 their patience exploded with (1)
it's discontent with the pace of modernization, (2) their
discontent with the conduct of the "war" in Eritrea, and,
(3) the Emperor's inability to deal with a major famine
which was raging in the northern part of the country.
By spring the military had taken control of the government.
A coordinating committee was established with both officer
and enlisted representatives elected from within the Armed
Forces. By September 19 74 the Dirgue (shadow), as the com-
mittee had come to be called, was no longer content to rule
indirectly. The Emperor was deposed and the Dirgue assumed
124full control. It is not necessary for this analysis to
recount the assassinations and executions which came about
as a result of infighting for power within the cliques which
124See Thompson, Blair, Ethiopia, The Country That Cut Off
It's Head
,
Robson Books, 1975 for a journalist's account of the





12 5formed the Dirgue . It is sufficient to know that the
Marxist elements (with decided Maoist tendencies) were able
to consolidate power and eliminate the conservative and
"IOC
moderate elements in the group.
4 . Enter the Soviet Union
By 1977 the United States found itself in the un-
enviable position of supplying arms to an increasingly
Marxist and repressive regime. The Congress took action to
disengage gradually, early in that year, but the Dirgue was
quicker on the draw. The MAAG was ordered out of the country
in May 1977. The Defense Attache's Office followed along
127
with approximately half of the Embassy staff on 4 June 1977.
With their departure all U.S. Military assistance and repre-
sentation to Ethiopia ended.
As mentioned earlier, Ethiopia is critically dependent
on the Franco-Ethiopian Railway to the port of Djibouti
and overland routes to the ports of Assab and Massawa, both
125
The Dirgue has had three Chairmen -- the first two
General Andom and General Taferi were assassinated by the
supporters of the third -- Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam. I had personal knowledge of over 400 assassinations
or executions during my stay in Ethiopia and have seen estimates
which indicate that of the original two hundred members of the
Dirgue only seven are alive today. For a view of the repres-
sive techniques used by the Dirgue see: Meyer-Lie, Arnt K,
"Statement," Economic and Military Assistance, Programs in
Africa
, pp. 16 7-17 5.
Randolph, R. Sean, "A Hand in the Pie: Ethiopia, Benin,
and the Guineas," Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa , Roger
Pearson (ed), Council on American Affairs, 1977, p. 70.
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The author was expelled with the Defense Attache's Office
and left on 3 June 1977.
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in Eritrea. These three ports are her only links to the sea
and the rest of the world. Both the railway and the over-
land routes to Eritrea have been arenas of conflict in recent
days. The Somali uprisings in the Ogaden have cut the link
to Djibouti -- an already tenuous link due to the tendency
of that country's majority toward Somalia. And the Arab
backed secessionist war in Eritrea appeared to be on the
verge of success. In addition to the conflicts in the
Ogaden and Eritrea, Ethiopia was attempting to deal with at
least four other major, organized revolts in other parts of
«a * 128the country
.
Faced with the departure, at their own request, of
their only arms supplier, the Dirgue increased it's Marxist
orientation and began to appeal for Soviet assistance in
the "ongoing peoples revolution." The Soviets were now in
a dilemma, from 194-5 to 1974 they had attempted to penetrate
Ethiopia on numerous occasions. The Emperor had been suf-
ficiently astute to know the direction from which his support
was coming and had played them off against the United States
.
Their rhetoric had returned to haunt them. Their problem now
was how to continue the strong relationship they had with
Somalia while supporting the Somali's worst enemy. The
12'
8
They are (1) Oromo Liberation Front - Southwestern
Provinces; (2) Ethiopian Democratic Union - Go jam and Begem-
idir Provinces; (3) Tigre Liberation Front - Tigre Province;





manner in which they solved (or didn't solve) the problem will
be discussed below. Suffice it to say they tried to satisfy
both.
The Soviets apparently saw the lessening requirement
for Kagnew Station and the concurrent drawdown of US personnel
as a weakness rather than the concious withdrawal from an
area no longer vital to U.S. interests that it was. The
Soviet Union had successfully countered UTS. involvement on
the Horn, but at this point it was debatable whether or not
the U.S. had any real interest in the area. The renversement
of the Soviets has been a costly one . Not only have they
pumped nearly a billion dollars in arms into Ethiopia but






The Somali remain largely a pastoral people. Of the
4,000,000 Somalis, an estimated 3,000,000 live within the
borders of the Somali Democratic Republic. The remaining
million are settled, or lead nomadic existances, in territory
claimed by neighboring countries - Ethiopia, Kenya, and
. 129
Djibouti. This becomes an important point when one con-
siders that deeply affecting every Somali is an irridentism
with it's roots in a traditional Moslem nationalism and the
Italian colonial experience. One must understand this factor
in order to fully understand Somali objectives.
An examination of the countries which comprise sub-
Saharan Africa will reveal that virtually all of them are
states rather than nations. Generally, they lack any uniform
national culture that will transcend internal ethnic divisions
Mr. I.M. Lewis sums up the main concern of most African leaders
as follows:
"The abiding preoccupation of most African
statesmen is with internal "nation-building,"
with the foundation and development of an
integrative national culture that will trans-
form their politically independent states
into culturally distinctive nations."
129




I.M. Lewis, "The Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup,"
The Journal of Modern African Studies, (10, 3), p. 384, 1972.
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On the other hand, the Somali perceptions are illus-
trated by Prime Minister Abdullahi 'Ise:
"The Somali form a single race, practice the
same religion, and speak a single language.
They inhabit a vast territory which, in its
turn constitutes a well defined geographic
unit . All must know that the Government of
Somalia will strive its utmost with the legal
and peaceful means which are its democratic
prerogative to attain this end: The union of
Somalis , until all Somali form a single
Great Somalia ." (emphasis added)
The uniqueness of the Somali is further elaborated
in additional remarks by Mr. Lewis:
"The special predicament of the Somali, then,
remains that whereas other independent African
States seek to make themselves into nations,
they seek to, build a state on the basis of their
nationhood." 1^
Prior to colonization in the mid-nineteenth century,
the Somali were divided into nomadic clans which roamed the
Horn of Africa with their flocks and herds. Their only con-
cession to authority was to Islam, and, in the sixteenth
century to Ahmed Gragn
.
The modern history of the country may be said to have
begun in the late nineteenth century when the British and
Italians began their slow colonization of the Somali coast.
131Abdullahi 'Ise, Policy Statement to the National
Assembly
,
Mogadishu, 26 Jul 59, quoted by I.M. Lewis, "Pan-
Africanism and Pan-Somalism," p. 150, The Journal of Modern
African Studies
, (1, 2), 1963.
132 Lewis, I.M., ibid., p. 161.
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At the end of World War II the British were charged
with administering all of present day Somalia as well as
parts of Ethiopia. However in 1949 the United Nations placed
the former colony of Italian Somaliland under trusteeship to
Italy. The Italian Trust Territory made excellent progress
toward self government and in 19 60 the British and Italian
trusteeships were granted independence. They merged to form
the Somali Republic on 1 July 1960. The new nation formed
a government on the western model and adopted a blue flag
with a white five pointed star. Each point on the star
represents an area occupied by Somalis . The Somali say
133
"two of the five are so far independent." From the out-
set the government adopted a policy completely opposite that
of most African nations, a policy of expansion of the state
134
to fully encompass the Somali nation.
2 . The Soviet Entry and the 1969 Coup
In 1963 the domestic pressure to regain the lost
territories began to increase and the Somalis sought more aid.
A tripartite offer (West Germany, Italy and the United States)
of $18 million in military assistance was refused because of:
133 Davidson, Basil "Somalia in 1975: Some Notes and Im-
pressions," Issue
,
p. 20, Spring 1975. The five areas are former
British and Italian Somalihand , Ethiopia's Ogaden regions, The
Northern Frontier District of Kenya and Djibouti.
134See Kaplan et al, Area Handbook for Somalia and Lewis,




"Quantitative and qualitative inadequacies
and above all, because of the political
conditions which accompanied it."
The main problem with the offer was that it only provided
for light arms and transport for five to six thousand men,
(in order not to offend Ethiopia) and that it was provided
on the condition that Somalia would agree to accept arms
from no other source . This was the opening the Soviet
Union was waiting for -- military aid worth $30 million to
equip and expand the Somali army to twenty thousand " men was
offered and accepted. By 1966 over 600 Somalis were in
training in the Soviet Union and a 250 man Soviet mission
137
was operating in Somalia. The reluctance of bordering
states to cede territory led to actual fighting with Ethiopia
and Kenya in 19 64. Periodic confrontations occurred with
fair regularity along both borders. This irridentist policy
was pursued with varying degrees of militancy, albeit without
13 8
success, until 1967.
135U.S. Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales and
Assistance Facts, p. 26, DSAA, 1975.
135
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A detailed account of events leading up to and during
the 1964 conflict can be found in Drysdale's The Somali Dispute
88

In that year the government adopted a new policy.
Detente with Ethiopia and Kenya and a decision to seek peace-
ful settlement of Somali claims to the "missing territories"
139
was the new name of the game. With the absence of an ex-
ternal threat to provide a stimulus for national solidarity,
a re-emergence of small group particularism among the lineage
groups and clans began to erode the government
.
On 15 October 1969 the President of the Republic
was assassinated. When it became apparent that there would
be no real change in the government with the selection of
a successor, the Army decided to act. In a bloodless coup
on 21 October 1969 Major General Siad Barre led the army
in seizing control. The state was to be governed by a
Supreme Revolutionary ' Council (SRC). The SRC stated it
would honor all existing treaties and commitments, would
support national liberation movements worldwide, and an-
nounced that henceforth the country would be known as the
141Somali Democratic Republic.
Siad quickly assumed control of the SRC and it's
policies and programs must be seen as principally his work.
Under his direction, the regime spent it's first year in an
13 9
.
"Somalia," Deadline Data on World Affairs
,
p. 32, McGraw-Hill Publications, 1970.
Davidson, "Somalia in 1975," pp. 20-21.
141
See Lewis, I.M., "The Politics of the 1969 Somali
Coup," for an extremly detailed and insightful account of
events up to the end of the first year of Siad's leadership.
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intense program to gain control of the people. Siad believes
that without change Somalia is doomed to political anarchy
and economic stagnation. He saw the people as the key then,
as he does now, and he set about to change the society of
Somalia. Siad announced to the Somali people, and to the
world, in January 19 71 that henceforth Somalia would adopt
142
"scientific socialism" as its orbit of reference.
Siad recognized that he was faced with poverty,
climatological uncertainties, limited natural resources, a
lack of infrastructure, and a turbulent nomadic population.
He also recognized the strong sense of national identity
and traditional self reliance of the Somali as a valuable
asset to his plans.
Somalia's development campaign rested on policies and
programs that were felt necessary to modify the factors which
impeded her development. Siad had modified the government and
established control with the SRC and was therefore able to
carefully lay his plans for the restructuring of Somali
society. Siad identified three of those programs as crucial:
(1) The mobilization of the people in support of
governmental policy - the ultimate goal of which remained
the establishment of "Greater Somalia."
142 Davidson, "Somalia in 1975," p. 21
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(2) A literacy program including development of a
written form of the Somali language. The complete literiza-
tion of the population would follow. Siad saw this as the
first step in politication of the people.
(3) A long range (15 years) resettlement program
encompassing land reform and reclamation, communal farming
and the winning over of the nomadic population to agriculture
.
The completion of these three programs would, in Siad's
eyes, lay the base for industrialization and movement into
the modern world. It would also, of course, provide a viable
socio-economic core to which the "missing territories" might
143
be attached. All that was required was aid.
Although the Soviets had provided support since
before the coup, the extent of the involvement did not
appreciably increase until 1971. In that year the U.S.
and West Germany were still operating Aid Missions in Somalia
and providing other than military assistance. Somalia's
small merchant fleet was conducting trade with North Vietnam.
In 1971 the aid allocations for Somalia were tied to the
cessation of that trade. The Somalia rejected what they
144
saw as blackmail and the U.S. mission was withdrawn.
The Soviets were only too happy to increase the extent of
their involvement, particularly in view of their growing
interest in the Indian Ocean and Africa.
Lewis, "Politics of the 1969 Somali Coup," p. 40 3.
14-u
.







1974 began as a very proud year for the SRC and
President Siad Barre . While his programs were succeeding,
11+5Somalia became the twentieth member of the Arab League;
her ties with the West seemed to be improving with contacts
146being developed with Italy and the EEC; and the Russians
147
as well as the Chinese were actively courting her friendship.
All that was lacking was rain -- since 1969 Somalia
had not had a year of normal rainfall -- and by mid-19 74
it became apparent that the traditional Somalia, "the land
of sheiks and warriors," had come to the end of the road.
By January 1975 the government had stripped it's
foreign exchange reserves, plunged $10 5 million into payment
deficit and had shelved ongoing programs in a literal "do or
die" battle against the worst drought the country had ever
148
seen. With over half of Somalia's livestock dead from
lack of water, over 250,000 nomadic tribesmen came to re-
settlement camps and relief centers seeking aid and a new
145
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life, the old life had died of thirst. In the long run
the drought benefitted the SRC programs by depriving the
nomads of the option to return to the old life without re-
flecting adversely on the SRC. But, the short run impact
was bankruptcy of the country. The SRC did everything
it could with all it had, yet the means available to it were
small. Siad Barre recognized this:
"This disaster means help on a big scale.
Help on a scale that Somalia cannot pro- , ,--.
vide for itself, technically or materially."
To add insult to injury, in February 1974 the rela-
tively stable Empire of Ethiopia began to crumble. The
Somali began to see an irrational and radical government
at the head of their traditional enemy. In Somali eyes
this Western supported military government was a threat to
Somalia's claim to the "missing territories" and a threat
to the Somalis who inhabited the Ogaden. The conflicting
claims of both nations to the French held Territory of Afars
Ibid.
Decrane , Phillipe , "Somalia Goes it Alone," The
Guardian
,
p. unk , 12 April 1975.
151Davidson, "Somalia in 1975," p. 25.
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and Issas with it's port of Djibouti also loomed large as
152
a potential causus belli . Prudence dictated that Somalia
prepare for the worst.
Appeals for drought assistance were met from a number
of sources. The EEC, U.N. World Food Program and the United
153States all provided foodstuffs. The response of the
154
Arab League was disappointing -- only Libya responded.
The greatest aid, however, came from the Soviet Union. Exact
dollar amounts are not readily available, but large numbers
of personnel and equipment as well as large amounts of sup-
plies were furnished to the Somalis . With the aid of the
Soviets the government felt capable of handling the domestic
problems generated by the drought -- but what of the military
ones?
4. A Soviet Client State ?
In July 1974 President Podgorny of the Soviet Union
visited Somalia and the two nations signed a "Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation" which included a substantial
. , . . . 155 The Soviets had longincrease in military assistance. &
152
At the time Djibouti was not independent and most
analysts speculated that conflict would erupt between Ethiopia
and Somalia over the territory upon the French withdrawal. The
French have remained militarily and the ultimate answer on this
question is still in doubt.
153
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been the sole arms supplier and primary aid donor to the
Somalis but this treaty had the effect of formalizing an
alliance and to many observers placed the Somalis irrevoc-
15 6
ably in the Soviet Camp
.
In the winter of 1974-75 Soviet influence in Somalia
approached domination. By 19 7 5 the original small scale
military training programs had increased tremendously in
size and scope. The intransigince of the West in 1963 and
again in 1971 had left Somalia with no choice but the Soviets.
During the period 1971 to 1976 Soviet military aid
to Somalia ($132 million) exceeded that of any other African
country except Egypt, and economic aid ($32 million) was
15 7
ranked fourth after Egypt, Algeria, and Guinea. In
addition to training programs, the Soviets had made Somalia's
army the fourth strongest, and only fully mechanized, army
on the continent. The Air Force was modernized with MIG's.
The only drawback from a Somali viewpoint, was that the
armed forces were totally dependent on the Soviet Union
15 8for fuel and spare parts. If one considers that in
addition to all this, the Soviet Union was also the main
-ice
It is significant that the Soviets have concluded
treaties of this type with only five other nations, they
are: Egypt, Iraq, India, Angola, and Mozambique.
157
.
"Soviet, Cuban Aid in Africa," Los Angeles





trading partner for Somalia, and that it has been estimated
that Somalia was dependent on the Soviets for 64 percent of




Siad insisted that Somalia was not a Soviet satellite,
that the Russians had made no demands, and that they were
nothing more than friends whose only desire was to help the
Somali. But the presence of Soviet naval facilities in
Berbera, on Somali soil, and an estimated 3,000 Soviet and
Cuban "technicians" in early 1977 seemed to give the lie to
Sxad s pronouncement
.
The fact of the matter was that the Soviets (and
most of the world) felt that they had gained an economic
stranglehold on Somalia. They perceived their control to
be enhanced by the fact that the army was logistically
dependent on the Soviet Union. The exception to this view
was the Saudi Arabians who began attempting to woo Somalia
toward a more nonaligned path.
5 . The Red Exodus
In March 1977 (and possibly earlier) the Soviet Union
was "invited" to help the Provisional Military Government of
159
.
"Afriscope Interviews Somali Head of State,"
Afriscope
,
p. 47, Jun 74.
1 R f)
Interview, .the author and Mr. Martin Jacobs, Deputy
Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Somalia, in Addis Ababa 14 Feb 7 7
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Socialist Ethiopia in it's struggle with reactionary and
counter-revolutionary movements . The Soviets allegedly
agreed to provide a program of military aid estimated at
$500 million. In April the Dirgue demanded that the U.S.
Military Advisory Group be withdrawn, as has been discussed.
Although the Soviets did not openly throw their
full weight behind the Ethiopians at this point, Siad --
and the Somlai people -- began to express concern for their
interests in the Ogaden . On 17 May 1977 Siad began to
criticize publicly Soviet perfidy (and the first Cubans who
1 R 9
were settling down in Addis Ababa) . His protests were
to no avail since by June the Dirgue had directed the ex-
pulsion of the U.S. Defense Attache and demanded a reduction
in American presence. The Soviets could not resist the
temptation to fill the vacuum.
In supporting Ethiopia the Soviets seriously mis-
judged Somalia. The Somali were not interested in the same
goal as the Soviet Union -- i.e. their only interest was the
"lost territories." In July the Somali living in the Ogaden
began their own war of liberation, and the SRC began support-
ing them with both troops and arms
.
1 fi l
Many of the assertions made in this portion of the
paper are based on personal observation and reports while
assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa from August 1976
to June 19 77.
162Authors personal observation,

The Soviet reaction was to halt arms shipments to
Somalia and increase assistance to Ethiopia. Siad visited
Moscow in August to try to resolve the situation but
apparently failed. On his return he began to pay closer
attention to' Saudi, Iranian, and U.S. comments and veiled
offers of aid. The payoff came on 15 November 1977 - the
unthinkable happened -- the Soviet Union and. Cuba were
directed to eliminate their military presence (diplomatic
as well for the Cubans) . The Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friend-
ship and Cooperation was abrogated and the Soviets and Cubans
went to Ethiopia.
C. ERITREA
1 . Colony to Independence
The Italian presence in Eritrea ended in 1941 when the
British invaded and liberated the colony from the Italians
.
They stayed for eleven years. Initially, the British were
unprepared for occupation duty and as a result many of the
officers in the Italian administration remained in their
posts. Consequently the basic day to day operation of
the colony remained unchanged until 1943.
In that year the British began two programs which
were to have a major effect on the by now growing national




p. 21. It should be noted that
this work is the definitive study of the British trusteeship
and the early years of the Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation.
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"Eritreanization" of the colony. A crash program to replace
Italian administrators and appointees with Eritreans got
underway in which the people were "encouraged to think for
164themselves and assume responsibility . " An expanded
educational system was established using Tigre or Arabic as
the language of instruction, depending on the linguistic
background of the majority within the school district.
In some cases even dialects were used. These programs were
highly successful with adults as well as with children
.. A . 165attending in many cases.
The politicization of Eritrea was the second major
project. Although responsible self-government took some-
what longer to establish itself in the minds of the people,
by the time Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia in 19 52,
lfi R
several co-existing political parties were in operation.
In short, Eritrea enjoyed a degree of political autonomy
and sophistication exceeding that known in Ethiopia.
The years of British rule were years of indecision
and argument regarding the future of the former colony. Most
proposals for resolving the dilemma were politically motivated.
164 T , . . ozIbid










Ethiopia was pro-annexation; the Italians felt they should
I CO
return to administer the colony and guide it to independence;
. . . 169
the British were in no hurry to leave; even the Russians
advanced a claim for the right to administer the region;
and finally the United States, having established a presence
171in Asmara, sided with Ethiopians. When the decision was
finally taken to ask the Eritreans , they, too, not surpris-
ingly, were divided. The majority of the Christians tended
to favor a union of some sort with Ethiopia. The Moslem
sector generally favored independence . It is probable that
the majority of the population in 1952 favored some form
172
of partnership with Ethiopia.
It fell to the United Nations to determine Eritrea's
fate. On 2 December 19 5 2 the General Assembly resolved that
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2 . The Emperor Takes Charge
The United Nations Federation scheme gave Eritrea
local autonomy and it's own political institutions while
assuring Ethiopia secure access to the sea and full control
ove«r the defense, foreign affairs, currency and port admin-
istration of the territory. The federation proved to be a
political disaster. The Eritrean Parliament, noted for
it's political activity, was in sharp contrast to it's
Ethiopian counterpart. The lack of free political institu-
tions in the Ethiopian state was apparent. In the 1950 's,
splits developed between the Emperor's representative in
Asmara and the Eritrean government. Complaints were heard
of violations of local autonomy, use of tax funds for Imperial




In reply to the criticisms mentioned above (and others)
the Emperor's Viceroy in Asmara stated in 1955:
"there are no internal nor external affairs
as far as the office of His Imperial Majesty's
Representative is concerned, and there will
be none in the future. The affairs of Eritrea.^
concern Ethiopia as a whole and the Emperor."
174 . . . . .Greenfield, Ethiopia
,
passim. This work has a very
well researched chapter on the failure of the Federation.
1 7 5
Luther, Ethiopia Today, p. 147.
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The Emperor and his government applied their leverage and
by 19 62 -- largely through bribery, patronage, and coercion --
they had emasculated the Eritrean Parliament which: "was
17Spersuaded to vote itself out of existance." The next
day the Eritrean Liberation Front was born and the war of
177
secession begun.
3 . Rebellion in the North
"A small number of the province's Tigrean
Christian majority allied themselves with
the E.L.F. because they saw themselves as '
discriminated against by the more numerous
and politically more powerful Shoan Amhara
in the central government. In addition
there was some sympathy for the E.L.F. among
radical students , some of whom viewed-them
as fellow opponents of the Emperor."
The adherence of a small number of Christians allowed
the E.L.F. to claim that it represented a cross-section of the
Eritrean people, though it remained closely tied to the Arab-
Muslim world. It's dominant ideologies were nationalism,
pan-Arabism, and Islam until younger and more radical elements
179implanted Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the mid-1960 's.
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This mixture of ideological, religious and, to some extent,
personality differences, resulted in internal divisions and
by 1971 two separate and distinct factions had been , created
.
The new group was known as the People's Liberation Front
(PLF) . Both groups were definitely leftist in orientation
with the PLF being the more Marxist of the two. The PLF
also split when the more Muslim elements formed the Eritrean
, 180Liberation Front - Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF).
All three of the major factions have received support
from the Arab world. Principal backers have included Egypt
(until 1967), Saudia Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya
all of whom have contributed moral support, arms, and cash.
More recent supporters include South Yemen, Tunisia, and
Kuwait. Connections have also been formed with the Palistine
181
Liberation Organization by the PLF.
Hailie Selassie was never successful in putting down
the Eritrean rebellion, but he was able to maintain a degree
of control in the area. Subsequent to his ouster the
situation deteriorated and by 19 77 the only hindrance to
victory were the deep divisions within the ranks of the
Eritreans . All the major cities had been lost by the Ethiopians
except Asmara and their hold there was tenuous at best.
130 See Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa
,







After an abortive invasion by a "peasant army" the
Dirgue attempted to resolve the issue with a "Nine Point
Peace Plan" which was rejected by the Eritreans and the
Arab states. The Eritreans had by now progressed beyond
agreements -- the only acceptable terms were complete
18?independence .
The successes of the Eritreans continued throughout
1976 and 1977. In July of 1977 the three major factions
18 3
agreed to the formation of a "democratic national front."
At this point the existance of an Eritrean national identity
is no longer questionable; in fact, Eritrea had become a
"stateless nation." The question now is: will that national
identity be realized in a nation-state, and will it survive?
The Cubans and Soviets seem to have been particularly
reticent about assisting the Ethiopians in a military solution
to the Eritrean question. Although Cuban troops have been
involved in action in the north -- the Cuban-Soviet support
has simply not reached the levels of the Ogaden conflict.
It is doubtful that it will — aiding in resisting aggression
is one thing and the suppression of a minority in someone
else's country is another.
It appears that the Soviets would welcome almost
any non-military solution to the problem of Eritrea because
18?
Ibid., p. 86, in effect the plan was to establish
a commission to mediate a peace and in the meantime return to
the status of the old federation.




of it's importance to stability in the region and the fact
that the ports the Soviets covet are located there. Until
the question is resolved, the Soviets will be unable to get
on with the business of consolidating their foothold on the
Horn and attaining the objectives that prompted their in-
volvement in the first place. Those objectives will be
discussed in the next chapter.
The rapidity of the collapse of the Ethiopian Empire and
it's replacement by a Marxist government; the humiliation of
the Soviet superpower by a country of 3 million nomads who
heretofore had been totally dependent on the largest of
the Soviet Union; the independence of Djibouti, the last
true colony in Africa; and the ongoing struggle of peoples
who feel themselves colonized in Eritrea and rhe Ogaden;
are the stuff of high drama indeed -- a social and political
upheaval that rivals in scope the great revolutions of earlier
times. Yet, unlike other great social changes and revolutions
which began internally, external actors (or non-actors) have
been the catalysts for events on the Horn.
It was as a result of the intrusion of Western tech-
nology and ideas that the armed forces of Hailie Selassie
. developed a modernization gap with the rest of the Empire.
The generation of a new cross-ethnic elite committed to





The colonial heritage of Eritrea and Somalia derived from
the Italians and the British and, exacerbated by Marxian
ideas of social reform and economy, prompted the Somali
irridentism and the Eritrean separatism which proved, and
continues to prove, destabilizing to the Horn of Africa.
The absence of firm support by the United States on the
one hand and the tremendous influx of Soviet military
assistance on the other made any attempt to stop the Somali
irridentist move impossible. And, once begun, the relative
impotence of the Organization of African Unity and the
conflict between Soviet and Arab strategies relative to





V. MUSICAL CHAIRS ON THE HORN:
THE NATIONAL INTERESTS
Until last year the ties between the Soviet Union and
Somalia were balanced by United States ties to Ethiopia. The
French (who controlled Djibouti until June 1977) bent with the
witn to ensure the balance held steady. That balance has now
changed dramatically and has forced a reassessment of interests
on the Horn and cannot fail to have some impact on foreign
policies of the actors toward Africa, and the rest of the
world
.
This chapter will examine the national interests of the
actors on the Horn of Africa. What is the national interest;
and how and why does it change? These are questions often
asked and rarely answered satisfactorily. James Dougherty
and Robert Pfaltzgraff respond to the first question thusly:
(The national interest is) "One of the
most frequently invoked criteria by which
policymakers attempt to formulate pol-
icies . . .This concept , . . . ,is generally
admitted to be an illusive one, having
both a fixed and a variable content.
The fixed and irreducible content .. .would
normally include the preservation of rhe
nation as an independent political com-
munity... The variable content is a func-
tion of myriad factors - the traditional
mythos , or set of ideals ,... the person-
ality of political leaders , the differing
political philosophies of rival political
parties, international conditions ... con-
temporary trends in public opinion, the
impact of .changing technology, and so
forth." 1 4
James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending
Theories of International Relations
,




Professor Frank Teti sees national interest in terms of
objectives, "without which there is no need to evaluate
18 5
or formulate policy."
This examination of the paramount objectives of the
actors on the Horn will only adTiress what appear to be the
most salient variables and of necessity will concentrate
on the main actors . Threaded throughout the discussion will
be comments on the strategic value of the area, the impact
of technology on its cultures, and situational factors.
Much of the analysis will be colored by personal observa-
tions and experiences encountered by the author while assigned
to the Defense Attache's Office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from
August 1976 to June 1977.
A. THE UNITED STATES
That the U.S. had substantial interests on the Horn at
one time has been substantiated earlier in this work. The
need for allies during the Korean War, the requirement for
a communications site at Kagnew Station, and the need to
deploy weapons systems in the Indian Ocean all militated
toward involvement in the Horn. As time passed the concern
for resupply routes to Israel, an unwillingness to cut off
the Emperor (our oldest ally in Africa) and the affection
"I q r
Teti, Frank, "Lecture en the National Interest," Naval
Postgraduate School, 9 Nov 77.
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and admiration that most Americans felt for "brave Ethiopia,"
were instrumental in maintaining the view that the U.S. had
vital national interests in the area. Most significant of
all and perhaps the only real reason for continued U.S.
interest, was the perception of spreading Soviet influence
and the desire to contain it.
The United States has no treaties, no real economic
interests , and no strong cultural ties with any of the
countries on the Horn. It appears that the ability of the
U.S. to face the Soviets in the Indian Ocean in a naval sense
is more than sufficient at the present time. And certainly,
the countries of the Horn do not pose a threat to the survival
of the United States. Some would cite the importance to
Israel of free movement through the Red Sea as a reason for
remaining deeply involved in the Horn. That importance may
be overemphasized. The Israelis have sufficient stocks of
fuel to last for any conceivable conventional war in the
Mideast. By the time thax fuel becomes a problem to them, it
seems logical to assume that the superpowers would be involved,
if not actually engaged, and at that point the Red Sea Routes
would become a rather low priority issue . Given the above --
does the United States have a national interests in the Horn
of Africa?
It would appear that the answer is yes -- writ small.
The interest is not so much in the countries of the Horn but
t
with the ability of actors (particularly the Soviets) and
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events on the Horn to influence other parts of the globe
where we do have vital interests, e.g. Southern Africa, the
Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula. The ability of the
Soviets to use the Horn as a springboard for projecting power
elsewhere in the region is the vital concern .
It should be apparent at this point that United States
national interests in the region, once satellites had effec-
tively replaced the Kagnew Station facility, have been limited
to reactions to Soviet initiatives and vaguely worded references
to "stability in the area." Soviet interests seem to be another
matter, and insofar as U.S. interests seem to be directly
related to soviet actions, it is necessary to examine rhe
1 p c
goals of the Soviet Union.
B. THE SOVIET UNION
The common knowledge would have it that the Soviet Union
has three major goals on the Horn: (1) to provide a counter-
weight to U.S. influence in the area; (2) to develop the
capability of projecting Soviet power, in peace and war, into
the African Continent and the Indian Ocean; and (3) to support
and assist those nations who have chosen to follow the Marxist
path, i.e. to live up to Soviet ideological commitments.
1 q c
See Farer, Tom, Warclouds on the Horn of Africa for
a discussion of the declining U.S. interests In the Horn.
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1 . Counter U.S. Influence
It has been related in the last chapter that the
Soviets had successfully countered United States involvement
in the Horn of Africa -- but, at this point it was question-
able whether or not the United States had any real desire to
remain "on the ground" in what was beginning to look like a
no win situation.
2 . Projection of Power
Most opinions of Soviet intentions on the Horn prior
to 1977 tended to stress the facilities formerly held by the
Soviets in Somalia, as the key to U.S. - Soviet naval com-
petition in the area. A closer examination results in a
somewhat different conclusion.
"If western facilities in the Indian Ocean
are lumped together ... they constitute a far
more substantial infrastructure than the
Russians have been able to assemble."
This statement would seem to support the idea that
in time of major conventional conflict that Western naval
power could be deployed in the Indian Ocean in overwhelming
amounts. And, in the case of a direct confrontation between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the Indian Ocean will probably
not be a theatre of major importance. What then is the
relationship between the Horn and Soviet objectives in the
Indian Ocean?
18 7
Farer, "Statement," Economic and Military Assistance
Programs in Africa
,
p . 15 8.
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a. Apparent Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean
Since 1968 the Soviet Union has deployed a rela-
tively small number of combatant vessels in the Indian Ocean.
Their number rarely exceeds ten except during regional crises.
Examples of increased strength occurred during the war between
India and Pakistan (six surface and six submarines) 13 and
during the 19 73 Middle East conflict. It appears, qualitatively
and quantitatively, that Russian naval activity in the area is
directed toward maintaining a small force which can be rapidly
enlarged during times of crises or tensions. Since 1975
the Soviets have also conducted long range reconnaissance
flights over the region.
Some analysis feel that Soviet reenforcement
above the normal six to ten vessels has been in response to
U.S. deployments into the region, rather than an attempt to
189influence littoral states during crises.
Soviet anchorages and facilities are maintained
at a number of locations on the Indian Ocean or its two
major appendages, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The map
on page 113 locates Soviet facilities as well as those used
by Western powers . Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean can
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MAP 5 - Naval S Air
Facilities in the
Indian Ocean
Source : The Indian Ocean and
the Threat to the West, Patrick
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(2) Protection of Soviet merchant and fishing vessels
"The Indian Ocean has come to figure prominently
in Soviet economic calculations . The Soviet
presence in the Indian Ocean is indicative of
Russia's growing economic ties with the region.
The commercial and trade relations with the
Indian Ocean countries necessitate a show of
Soviet presence in the waters... The Indian
Ocean sea-lanes, that is, a secure and steady
access to them, have become an important part
of the Soviet Union's Indian Ocean configurations
(3) Ensuring lines of communication:
"...the geographic necessity to maintain the
communication line between the European and
East Asian parts of the Soviet Union. The
Soviet Navy is divided into four fleet areas:
the Arctic, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the
Pacific areas . Assured connection between the
three European fleets and the Pacific fleet can ?
only be maintained through the Indian Ocean."
191






'Valik, Ferenc A., Politics of the Indian Ocean Region
,
pp. 180-181, The Free Press, 1976.
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(1) Denial to the naval forces of the West:
"...even if American nuclear submarine
deployment were minimal ... the Indian Ocean
does indeed constitute a logical area for
(their) deployment .. .While it is true that
the USSR does not currently possess the cap-
ability to locate and destroy enemy nuclear
submarines and that the Soviet naval vessels
in the Indian Ocean do not currently consti-
tute an antisubmarine strike force, it may
be assumed that Moscow is hard at work in an
effort to develop such capabilities. In the
meantime the Soviets are busy in the Indian
Ocean laying the necessary groundwork ... to
maintain such a capability."
(5) Intervention in local conflicts in support of
liberation movements
:
"...from a Soviet point of view, overseas
capability, by the negative act(s) of
confronting and preventing (and replacing)
Western intervention, has enabled revolu-
tionary forces to perform . . . what is , qu
regarded .. .as their historical function."
Political :
( 1 ) Influence and Prestige :
"To 'show the flag' has been a time-honored
device to increase influence and prestige...
To demonstrate its naval strength in a man-
ner consistent with international law and
established practices, the Soviet Union un-
dertook to advertise its superpower status
by a naval presence in waters which, prior
to the midgsixties , did not see Soviet naval
s .
1 Q 3 Smolansky, Gleg M., "Soviet Entry into the Indian Ocean
An Analysis," The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and
Military Importance
,
pp. 342-343 by Alvin M. Cottrell and
R.M. 3urrell (eds) , Praeger Publishers, 1972.
194Jukes, Geoffery, The Soviet Union in Asia
,
p. 8-1,
University of California Press, 1973.
19 5 Valik, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region, p. 13 2.
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(2) Internationalist mission - the Navy as a Political
Actor :
"The (Soviet) fleet's current importance as
a foreign-policy instrument is not only a
function of its application in periods of
international tension .. .Since about 1969,
the political strategy governing the use of
military force has shifted from defense to
offense. The change in strategy has led to
greater naval activism in promoting as well
as defending Soviet global interests ... In
this sense it is suggested that the Soviet
Navy is not only an instrument, of policy but
the object of policy as well." D
(3) Political containment of China:
"The Soviet naval presence serves as a pol-
itical sedative to assure these (Indian Ocean
littoral) countries of Moscow's countervailing
strength. Chinese negotiators, advisors, or
trainers are often preferred to those of the
Soviet Union. But China is unable to muster
a naval presence in the Indian Ocean-, it can-
not match the... effect of Soviet warships in
the harbors of the region. '.'
It seems that the broad strategic requirements
of the Soviet Union are to protect economic interests in the
region and to maintain a naval force which undercuts Chinese
penetration, and oppose, if necessary, American missile
threats. At the same time the Soviets are more than willing
to take advantage of the political spin-off that such presence
gains in terms of political leverage, prestige, and influence
among littoral states
.
Kelly, Anne M., "Port Visits and the 'Internationalist
Mission' of the Soviet Navy," in McGwiren , Michael (ed),
Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions
,
p. 511, Praeger Publishers, 1977.
197 Valik 'olitics of xhe Indian Ocean Region, p. 132.
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Is the Horn of Africa critical to attainment of
the Soviet Union's Indean Ocean Objectives? To put it another
way, would the loss of the Horn by the Soviets result in
their inability to attain those objectives? To answer
this question an evaluation of the importance of the Horn




(1) Interdiction: The geographic importance of the Horn
relates to the routes through the Red Sea, not the "Cape
routes." In time of war or crisis the Red Sea-Suez Canal
routes would be unusable, through either Soviet action or
through friendly action to seal off the Soviet naval forces
in the Indian Ocean. Any attempt to interfere with the oil
routes in a crisis situation could lead to rapid escalation
of tension to conflict between the West and the Soviet Union,
which would render the oil routes irrelevant. In any case,
Soviet facilities at Hodeida and Basra Urn Quassar are
adequate, and probably better located, for interdiction
missions. The Horn is not critical to attainment of this
objective
.
(2) Protection: The Horn's location is well suited for
this mission in normal times. Soviet activity through the
Red Sea and Suez can be protected by ships operating out of
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ports on the Horn. During wartime, however, for the reasons
mentioned above, the utility of bases on the Horn declines.
It would seem that if the Soviets can protect their merchant
and fishing fleets in other distant waters without benefit
of land support facilities, they can do the same in the
Indian Ocean. That they have done so in the past (prior
to 1975) indicates that the Horn is not critical in attain-
ing this objective.
(3) Ensuring: Having stressed the strategic advantage
of the Indian Ocean to the Soviets as a link between their
fleets, it would seem compelling that control of the Horn
is critical to ensuring lines of communication. Thoughtful
reflection, however, gives the lie to that assumption. The
Suez-Red Sea route cannot be defended or maintained in time
of war. One ship sunk in the Suez Canal closes off the choke
point. At best this route provides the Soviets with a means
for rapidly deploying forces in times of peace and low tension
Any attempt to force the canal would result in the escalating
of conflict and probable closure of the waterway. The Horn
is important to this objective in time of peace but not
relevant in times of hostility or tension.
C+) Denial: Given the rapid improvement in weapons tech-
nology, this objective is no longer valid. Weaponry no longer
requires that the Indian Ocean be used as a launch area for
I

ballistic missiles directed at the Soviet Union. If denial
is an objective, it is political, not military in nature.
Soviet control of the Horn in a nuclear war scenario would
not appreciably affect the outcome, primarily because of the
negative effects mentioned above on Soviet ability to re-
enforce Indian Ocean forces during periods of increased ten-
sion that would probably precede a nuclear war.
(5) Intervention: Of all the military objectives
identified, the ability to intervene in support of liberation
movements is most relevant to the Horn of Africa. The Horn
itself is an example of that intervention. If Soviet inten-
tions are to intervene in African disputes , the Horn of Africa
is critical from a geographic view. The same rationale applies
to involvement in potential conflicts on the Arabian Peninsula
and in the Middle East. However, no appreciable strategic
advantage is gained in influence over events in littoral
countries to the East of the Horn. The Soviets have the cap-
ability to pro]ect power southward into India, Pakistan, Burma
etc. without reliance on facilities in the Horn. The Horn is
critical to intervention in Africa but not of significance
to intervention in Indian Ocean states .
The relevance of the Horn of Africa to Soviet
Military objectives m the Indian Ocean appears to be




(1) Influence and Prestige: The Soviet expulsion from
Somalia, particularly after similar occurrences in Egypt and
Sudan require that the Soviets retain a hold on the Horn or
risk losing credibility, not only in the Indian Ocean, but
throughout the Third World. For a superpower to be pushed
around by a country of just three million souls is intoler-
able and some redress must be obtained. Thus, a Soviet
success on the Horn, i.e. control of Ethiopia, is imperative
to Soviet maintenance of influence and prestige in the
Indian Ocean, Africa, and throughout The Third World.
(2) Navy as a Political Actor: Much has been made of the
Soviet naval influence in the Indian Ocean. For the Soviet
Navy particularly, the expulsion from their only "base" in
the Indian Ocean must have been galling. Much of the Soviet
effort on the Horn has undoubtedly been at the urging of
naval policy makers in the Kremlin. The Navy would view the
loss of the Horn much as many view the U.S. military experience
in Vietnam and with serious repercussions within the Soviet
leadership. If the Soviet Navy is to continue as a political
actor control of the Horn is critical.
(3) Political Containment: Although not bearing directly
on Sino-Soviet affairs , the Horn of Africa affords the Soviets
a secure base, well outside the influence of Peking, from which
to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean. The Horn has also
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been an area of contested influence with both the Somalis
and the Ethiopians reacting favorably to Chinese initiatives.
Of perhaps more importance
,
the Horn again can act as a
"springboard" from which to counter Chinese involvement in
African nations to the south, i.e. Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia
Although not critical to Indian Ocean objectives, a defeat
on the Horn by the Chinese would bode ill for Soviet influence
in Africa and the Indian Ocean.
It appears that the Horn of Africa is only peripher-
ally important to the Soviet Union in the attainment of her
Indian Ocean objectives. Although Soviet control of the
Horn facilitates achieving such objectives, loss of the Horn
in both political and military contexts would not negate
attaining those goals . It would seem that the linkage between
the Horn of Africa and Soviet objectives in sub-Saharan Africa
and the Middle East are of more significance. It appears the
Soviets feel that way as well -- at any rate it is difficult
to come up with another reason for their gambling a $100
million naval facility in order to gain entry into a country
that could be landlocked in very short order.
3 . Ideological Commitment
The Soviets have often been accused of using ideology
as a rationalization after the fact in foreign policy
decisions . This may have been the case in Somalia and
Ethiopia. The. manner in which the Soviets developed their
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perception of a "client state" in Somalia has been discussed
It appeared in 1976 that Somalia could make no move without
Soviet concurrence. At the same time Ethiopia's revolution
was seen to shift from one oriented on social reform to an
ultra-Marxist and repressive regime.
Although the Soviets did not immediately back the
Ethiopians, Siad saw the writing on the wall and began to
criticise Soviet actions . This was unsuccessful as by June
the Dirgue had directed the expulsion of U.S. personnel men-
tioned earlier. The Soviets could not resist the invitation
and the temptation to fill the vacuum. It may be argued
that they did so on purely abstract grounds - Ethiopia is a
more populous and larger country, and is more capable of
supporting itself than Somalia. The prestige of Ethiopia
has been greater than Somalia's in the view of other African
198
and Third World countries. Yet, at bottom line, it is a
defensible argument that they moved in because they were
obliged to do so -- wars of liberation must be supported.
Without a doubt the Soviets must have felt capable
of managing their Somali "clients" regardless of Soviet
actions toward Ethiopia. After all, didn't they both share
the same goals? The answer was no - the Somali were not
198 Shipler, David K., "Moscow's Setback," New York
Times, p. 1, 14 Nov 77.
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interested in the spread of an ideology: that was a Soviet
concern -- the Somalis wanted the missing territories. The
Western Somali Liberation Front began their own war of
liberation in the Ogaden.
The Soviets responded by increasing aid to the
Ethiopians. Talks with Podgorny and Castro convinced Siad
that Somali goals would have to wait so he began talking
to the Saudis and the West. Soviet insensitivity to
popular demands and aspirations and perhaps a bit too much
opportunism resulted in their expulsion from Somalia.
In their quest for satisfaction of their three goals
on the Horn, the Soviets have not done well. They have
countered U.S. involvement in the area at a time when U.S.
interest seems to be at it's lowest ebb in years. They have
not yet increased their capability for projecting Soviet
power into the region (except for assistance direct to
Ethiopia). Indeed, they have accomplished the opposite.
The loss of facilities in Somalia has probably limited their
capability in this regard and cannot be truely offset until
a solution is reached in the Eritrean situation. They have
achieved an ideological success in Ethiopia but have suffered




If doubt exists as to who engineered the intervention
in Angola -- the Soviets or the Cubans -- there is no doubt
about Ethiopia and the Horn. It was first and last a Soviet
Show. Demitri Simes writes:
"...the USSR was much more directly involved
militarily in the Horn. The Angolan campaign
could described as a Soviet-backed Cuban
exercise. In Ogaden, however, the Soviets were
heavily engaged in both the planning and the
implementation of operations, staying short
of only the actual fighting None of these
states (Eastern Block), and Cuba is no excep-
tion have any serious interests in the Horn of
Africa. Their involvement entirely serves
Soviet objectives."
Yet , the fact remains that without the Cubans it would
probably not have been possible for the Soviets to accomplish
what they have done in the Horn.
Following Castro's trip to the Horn in March 1977, the
first group of 50 advisors arrived in Addis Ababa, disguised
as medical assistance personnel. The numbers of Cubans
increased rapidly until over 16,000 combat troops were presen"
and involved in the fighting on the Horn. The Cuban role
had changed to a direct combat function in the Ogaden by
March 1978 in an attempt (successful) to bolster the failing
1 " 9 Simes, Demitri. "Global Imperialism in the Making,"
Washington Review, p. 37, 197 8.
200 Personal observation of author,
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Ethiopian Army. The Cubans have been less anxious to become
involved in the Eritrean fighting although some reports indicate
that they have done so
.
Havana's public rationale is that there are no Cuban
objectives or interests on the Horn and that the Cubans are
there simply because they were asked to come by the Ethiopians.
Inferences that the Cubans act as the agents of the Soviets
are met with sharp denials .
"Cuba will go on giving the African liberation
movements the help they need, with or without
coordination with other countries. It will be
according to what we decide." (emphasis added)
Cuba's main objective seems to be the "exportation of
revolution" and the sympathetic support of a progressive
nation in trouble. Yet, in reality, Cuba has no interests
on the Horn and virtually all of her involvement there is
in pursuit of Soviet objectives.
D. CHINA
China's impact on events in the Horn is important even
if only in the manner in which it affects the Soviet mindset
.
Chinese reactions with Ethiopia did not cause the Soviets
any concern until 19 71. Admittedly, Chou ' s trip in 19 54
created "a "ripple" in the Kremlin but because no agreements
developed out of that visit, the effect was not lasting.
2 01
Eontaine, Roger W., "Cuba on the Horn," Washington
Review
,




After the Cultural Revolution, diplomatic ties were resumed
and in 1971 during the Emperor's visit to Peking a loan
2 2
of $84 million was negotiated for development projects.
Early in the revolution of 1974 the Dirgue adopted a Maoist
approach to which there was no significant response by Peking
until after the Dirgue began their shift to a more Soviet
i • 203 e . .. ,, „line. Since the commencement of open soviet involvement,
Chinese support for Somalia has been wholehearted and anti-
Soviet as might be expected.
"800 million Chinese people totally
support the Somali people's just
struggle for independence and
national Sovereignty."
Since a Chinese influence in Africa helped to shape the
original Soviet decision to become involved in Somalia in 1963,
the Soviet commitment to the Dirgue might be viewed as a
counter to Peking's challenge to Soviet influence.
In 1969 the military coup was conducted by officers who
had been largely trained in the Soviet Union. This pro-Soviet
orientation and the Cultural Revolution resulted in a lessening;
2 2McLane, Charles B., Soviet African Relations
,
pp. 42-47,
Central Asian Research Center, 1974.
20 3 An explanation for this missed opportunity tor the PRC
is probably China's preoccupation with events in Angola
and a mis-estimate of U.S. commitment to the Ethiopians.
The Maoist rhetoric by the Dirgue may have been a factor in
the Soviet decision to support them in 1976.
20 4 Ping-nan, "Speech" in Mogadiscio on 11 Sep 77, quoted
in Africa Research Bulletin , p. 4559, Africa Research limited,




of Soviet tension over Chinese involvement . However the
Chinese continued to provide considerable aid to Somalia and
in fact $110 million for road construction in 1971 repre-
sented the second largest Chinese investment in Africa (the
Tanzam Railway was the biggest). There appears to be no
evidence of direct Chinese involvement or influence in
Siad's decision to oust the Soviets but rhetoric of the type
quoted above would indicate they wholeheartedly supported the
decision
.
One can assume that the PRC did not act overtly in either
Ethiopia or Somalia to influence the Soviet decision to
support Ethiopia, or the Somali decision to oust the Soviets.
It is clear, however, that the Chinese support for Somalia's
attempts to dissuade the Soviets from supporting Ethiopia
probably made the decision to expell the Soviets easier.
It is obvious that the Chinese fear any Soviet success
in the Indian Ocean area.
"In the Horn of Africa -- as in other parts
of the Third World -- Peking sees Soviet
policy in the Horn and the Red Sea as con-
firming its view that the 'modern stars'
are pursuing a 'world hegemonic' ambition
which requires the expansion of its foreign
military bases, especially in the Indian
Ocean littoral states . They interpret the
expansion of the Soviet Navy in the region
as part of a developing two-pronged naval
threat to the Indian sub-continent and
South East Asia -- and to China itself. ,,205
205 Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 14
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Accordingly, one must view the Peoples Republic of China
as regarding denial of influence to the Soviet Union as
its primary goal on the Horn of Africa.
E. FRANCE AND DJIBOUTI
The newest internatinally recognized independent nation
in Africa, Djibouti is one of the most desolate places on
205
earth. It's principal resources are sand and salt and
it is the smallest of the countries on the Horn. Without
it's port and the railway to Addis Ababa, it would be of
absolutely no consequence in affairs on the Horn and probably
would have been partitioned between Ethiopia and Somalia
long ago.
The port and railway were the lifeline for over 50 per
cent of Ethiopia's imports and exports prior to 19 74 and
given the situation in Eritrea was of obvious importance
207if not crucial to the Ethiopians . " The fact that the
preponderant ethnic group in Djibouti is of Somali origin
was of some concern to both major actors on the Horn -- the
Somali because of their irridentist orientation and the
Ethiopians as a threat. However, as long as the French
9 n r
See Thompson and Adloff, Djibouti and the Horn of Africa
for a somewhat dated but still the best English language
work on this little known region.
9 7
Estimates made at U^S. Embassy, ADdis Ababa, 1976.
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occupied the territory, the Ethiopians (albeit anxious) never
felt in imminent danger. As a result of that anxiety, alter-
nate port facilities and a highway were built at Assab, in
Eritrea
.
At independence, granted by the French in June 19 77, a
bilateral agreement provided for the stationing of 4,000
Foreign Legionnaires in Djibouti to "protect the country from
n p
any external threat." The French and the new government
had successfully satisfied both Somalia and Ethiopia and
forstalled a takeover by either country. It is unlikely
that Djibouti would remain independent for long if the
French were to leave
.
All this being said, the value of the port of Djibouti
has long been overrated, except as it applies to Ethiopia .
The railway to the port has been interdicted by the Somali
insurgents in the Ogaden and had it not been for the Emperor's
foresight in building up Assab, Ethiopia might well be choking
209
to death today . ~ As far as the larger strategic value is
concerned, it is just as easy to cover the approaches to the
Red Sea from Berbera in Somalia -- a fact the Soviets recog-
nized in 1973: it is, however, impossible to do so from the
middle of Ethiopia -- a fact driven home to the Soviets by
events in Somalia.
2 8 Information first obtained by author in private interview
in Djibouti, October 1976.
2 9
The author was present in May 19 7 7 when Somali insurgents
cut the rail link by destroyeing two bridges.
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Should Eritrea succeed in her bid for independence , the
value of Djibouti will increase both in Somali and Ethiopian
eyes and without a French presence, there is no doubt that
violence and annexation attempts would take place. Fortunately,
the French appear to be ready to stay for a while.
F. THE AFRICAN STATES
The instability in the Horn has been a matter of concern
to the Organization of African Unity since the border con-
flicts of 1964. The OAU's attempts at mediating the disputes
met with some success in the Khartoum Agreement and the
Arusha Agreement of the mid-sixties. Unfortunately these
initiatives were little more than stop-gap measures which
never really addressed the basic causes of troubles in the
Horn -- essentially a resolution of the boundary issues
.
The OAU has never wavered from its position of treating the
Erirrean issue as a purely internal affair and the Somali
issue has always been avoided by retreat behind the basic opDO-
sit ion, in principle, to border changes through violence.
Sudan and Kenya, both affected by events within the
Horn have pursued their own interests. Both countries fear
the danger of a "spillover 17 of conflict into their own
territory and both have expressed concern about growing




Sudan has always sympathised with the Eritrean
cause and views the Soviet presence as the greatest threat
to her integrity. Nimeiry's attempts to mediate the
escalating Eritrean" situation in 1976 were futile because
of the intransigence of the Dirgue and the growing Soviet
influence within that body. Sudanese policies shifted
toward open opposition toward the Dirgue .
"(he) cannot ignore this bloody conflict
which is knocking at (Sudan's) eastern
gateway and dragging,- inside his borders
the sorrows of war."
It appears that Sudan's objectives are to prevent incursions
upon her own territory while limiting Soviet influence in the
Horn by encouraging the formation of an autonomous Eritrea,
Muslim in nature if possible.
2 . Kenya
Kenya views Somalia as her greatest threat. While
decrying and fearing increased Soviet presence in the region,
she has allowed Moscow to ship arms through Mombasa to the
Ethiopians. Kenyan paranoia over Somalia's claim to the
Northern Frontier District has led her to attempt to walk
a tightrope. It would seem that Kenya feels capable of
balancing increasing Soviet presence by escalating its own
military assistance from Washington and by backing
210 Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 15
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Ethiopia which is seen as the most powerful regional
state in the conflict . Kenya follows the OAU line with
respect to Eritrea.
Kenya may be the most astute of the regional states
in the line she has chosen to follow. By it's very nature,
Ethiopia will always be the dominant nation on the Horn.
History has shown that no "occupier" or invader has ever
lasted long on the Horn, they are accepted partially absorbed
but always ultimately expelled. If the cycle repeats it-
self Kenya will be in an excellent position.
G. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSIAN GULF
1 . Israel
The Solomonid legend aside, the Israeli connection
with Ethiopia goes back a long way.' The first Israeli con-
sulate was opened in Addis Ababa in 1956.
"The Israelis were (and are) convinced
that the territorial and political
stability of Ethiopia was the corner-
stone for the stability of the entire
area."
Hailie Selassie exchanged neutrality in the Arab-
Israeli conflict in return of technical and military
assistance. However, formal ties between the Ethiopians and
211Ledeen, Michael A., "The Israeli Connection," The
Washington Review
,
p . 4 9, May 1978.
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the Israelis ended in 19 7 3 as the Emperor bowed to Black
African pressure yet, informal relations continued until 1977.
The "conventional wisdom" has it that the Israeli interest in
Ethiopia is the prevention of Arab hegemony on the Red Sea
littoral, i.e. to keep the sea lanes open -- but, there are
other factors as well; Michael Ledden elucidates them:
"...(to) continue to use Ethiopia as a half-
way house on the way to Kenya and South Africa;
her fear of the Red Sea becoming an "Arab Lake"
;
her concern about growing Soviet influence, until
recently centered in Somalia; ...and her antagonism
to the Eritrean revolt, which was closely linked
to the PLO."
Israel's objectives therefore tend to follow the Kenyan
line of "dealing with the Somalis (and Eritrean rebels) first
and worry about the Soviets and Cubans later." In no wise
can Israel ignore Arab victories, no matter how remotely
connected or how far away. Any Arab success, no matter how
small, is a much greater threat to the Israelis than a Soviet
presence on the Horn. Although no doubt exists they would
rather not see a Soviet presence on the Horn either.
2 . The Arabs and the Gulf
The Arabs and the Iranians both view events on the
Horn as dangerous to long term security goals in their own
camps. With the majority of Arab nations as well as the
Iranians involved to a greater or lesser degree in the






the right of passage in the sea lanes. In this regard,
their major common objective seems to be the preservation
of at least a status quo in the Indian Ocean region, in-
cluding the Horn. A second consideration by the two leading
powers in the group, Iran and Saudi Arabia, seems to be
a recognition that perhaps the United States cannot be
depended upon when the chips are down. The major arms
build up in the Persian Gulf and on the Peninsula could, in
part, be traced to these two factor.
"Even before fighting erupted between Ethiopia
and Somalia, the Saudia had been courting the
regime in Mogadishu in an attempt to wean it
away from the Soviet Union... Once fighting broke
out, Saudi Arabia and other conservative regimes
are believed to have served as financial backers
...for Somalia's war effort in the Ogaden . . . Much
of the aid... would only be delivered in the case
of an Ethiopian invasion into Somalia„itself and
not just the retaking of the Ogaden."
The last sentence is important. In Somalia, just as with
the aid furnished to the Eritreans by the Arab states , there
is just enough furnished to keep the pot boiling, but never
enough to allow a decision to be reached in an all out effort
A fruitful region for further study might be the use of
events on the Horn by the Arabs, Israelis, or Iranians in
order to gain concessions and additional armaments from the
West and other suppliers as well as to keep the superpowers
in mutual confrontation
.
213 Legum and Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa., p. 15.
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It would seem that the Arabs have an interest in
limited Eritrean and Somali success if for no other reason
than the discomfiture it would cause the Israelis. The
anti-Soviet attitude of the Arab world in general also
dictates a hostile reaction to the Dirgue .
The Saudis and the Iranians have their own unique
interests as well. To the Iranians it is an Indian Ocean
problem and increased Soviet presence anywhere in the
region is a matter of grave concern. The Shah's fear of
an "Iranistanization" of his country under the Soviet
Union coupled with the unrest within Iran today makes it
imperative that he pursue a policy that opposes radical
regimes and Soviet attempts at increasing influence in the
region
.
The Saudis also oppose the rise of radicalism in the
area for fear of it's "spillover" effect. The Saudis also
feel a religious obligation to support the predominately
Muslim Somalis . In short, economic security considerations
and a commitment to traditional rule , as opposed to "radical
regimes" and in the case of the Saudis a religious commitment
have prompted Tehran and Riyadh to become leading opponents




Having examined at length the regional actors on the
Horn of Africa and to a lesser degree the influence, ob-
jectives, and interests of the external actors it is appro-
priate at this point to attempt to integrate these views
in order to reach some conclusions about the state of
affairs on the Horn and the direction they may take . The
Horn has been viewed here from three perspectives: (1)
internal aspects, (2) regional linkages, and (3) external
influences . Each of these three viewpoints converge to form
strategic considerations. It is in that fashion that his
chapter will extrapolate from the inferences of this study.
A. INTERNAL ASPECTS
c
None of the actors on the Horn are so secure that they
are immune from internal threats . In fact , all five of
the states, Ethiopia and Somalia in particular, face
potentially or actually serious internal problems
.
1 . Ethiopia
In addition to the Western Somali Liberation Front
in the South and the Eritrean Liberation Front and associated
group in Eritrea, the Dirgue is contending with at least
four other organized liberation movements . "" Soviet and
Cuban assistance have enabled the Dirgue to deal fairly
214 See page 83 above for a discussion of these groups
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effectively with the Somali threat but it does not appear
that great success is forthcoming in Eritrea or in the other
provinces . The brutal and repressive measures taken by the
Dirgue coupled with the lack of any real social change
resulting from their policies ensures that armed struggle for
independence and freedom from "black colonialism" will con-
tinue in the Ogaden and Eritrea. As the Dirgue continues
to lose it's credibility with the people and when the people
begin to see the Soviets as simply a new balabat (nobiiitiy),
dissidence will increase.
2 . Somalia
Disaffected Somali Army officers reportedly staged
an attempted coup d'etat against Siad Barre ' 3 government
215
on 9 April 19 77. Barre s success in putting it down
reinforces the notion that the Somali will support a leader
who appears to be effective as long as an external threat
exists. In short, even though regimes may change in Somalia,
the burning desire to reclaim the "lost territories" will
continue to unite the Somali nation. Economic considerations
may generate internal problems but if the government can
continue to receive the foreign aid required to deal with
the economic factors , Somalia will probably remain a relatively
stable actor on the Horn. A case could be made for a resur-
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territories" be recovered and the external threat eliminated
thereby, however, that is not a likely occurrence in the




. The Other States on the Horn
Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya all have potential problems
of internal stability. Djioubti should remain stable as
long as the French maintain their presence there. Should
the French troops leave, and should Eritrea continue to
be cussessful in her bid for independence, then Djibouti
will almost certainly become a causus belli for renewed
conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The greatest threat to Sudan and Kenya is the "spill-
over" effect that could come about as a result of combat in
Eritrea or the Ogaden. Should Ethiopia begin to support
the dissident Ansar groups in Southern Sudan or, the Somalis
the inhabitants of the Northern Frontier District in an
attempt by either country to influence the regional policies
of Sudan or Kenya, serious threats to the stability of the
present regimes could result . As long as the differences
between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia are kept within their
own borders Kenya and Sudan should be capable of maintaining
internal stability.
B. REGIONAL LINKAGES
The Horn of Africa represents a mini-international system
which is essentially bi-polar in nature and seeking equilibrium
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The factors of geography, religion and social development
have combined to create two opposing cultures which are in
a struggle for dominance. The Horn is not a simple ideological
battleground, nor is it a purely territorial dispute. The
roots go deeper -- to- things which are primordial -- the
factors of race, religion, kinship, and custom all weigh heavily
in the equation. If can be said with a fair degree of cer-
tainty that regional tensions and conflicts will exist on the
Horn until equilibrium is achieved -- until Eritrea is
independent or conquered and the Somali gain their lost
territory or lose their national identity.
Considering the degree of internal discontent within the
actors , the serious economic and social problems which exist
and the factors of poverty, rising expectations and an
increasing modernization gap, all of which have been ex-
acerbated by the severity of recent drought and warfare
,
it is unlikely that the Horn of Africa can overcome the
imbalance caused by external actors to achieve that
equilibrium in the forseeable future
.
C. EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
The superimposition of ideology upon the already deep
and serious primordial cleavages extant on the Horn has
accellerated the rate of change. Historically, great
events in the region have been precipitated by external
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actors . The Horn has tended to absorb what it can digest
from the intruder, but ultimately rejects the remainder.
The Arabs, Portugese, Egyptians, Italians and most recently
the Americans , are examples
.
The external actors involved today also contribute to
the deepening and in some cases creation of cleavages within
the region. If the historical trend holds true the Soviet
Union will be no exception and will find that she is a
little more than the Horn can effectively digest. In the
wake of the Soviet departure there will remain old and new
wounds which must be healed if the Horn is ever to achieve
it's normal balance.
D. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The Horn of Africa does have strategic value, both in a
geopolitical and an ideological sense. It's geopolitical
significance is marginal with respect to the Indian Ocean
but great in terms of its use as a "spring board" into
other regions. The second major point that surfaces in
this analysis is that no one , except the Soviets and perhaps
the Dirgue , really desires a Soviet presence on the Horn.
Given the apparent future course of events in Africa, par-
ticularly the south, and the increasing paranoia of the
Arab world regarding Soviet intentions , it seems likely
that the Horn will continue to be a troubled spot in the
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world. A solution to the Middle East problem could result
in two strategies developing on the Horn -- Soviet-Ethiopian
and the rest of the World's.
It would seem to the author that it would be a far better
thing for the Soviets to bear the burden of a fragmenting and
contentious Ethiopia while the United States extends it's
hand to the perhipheral states . Mot in the sense of estab-
lishing an American presence but rather in the sense of moral
and economic support. When the ultimate equilibrium is
achieved and the Soviets have gone the way of all other
intruders on the Horn, we would be in a far better position
to assist in the development of that "natural economic unit"





I . Biblical Version
"And when the Queen of Sheba heard of the fame of
Solomon concerning the name of the Lord she came to prove
him with hard questions .
And she came to Jerusalem with a very great train,
with camels that bare spices and very much gold, and precious
stones: and when she was come to Solomon, she communed with
him of all that was in her heart
.
And Solomon told her all her questions: there are not
anything hid from the King, which he told her not.
And when the Queen of Sheba had seen all Solomon's
wisdom, and the house that he had built,
. . .And she gave the king one hundred and twenty talents
of gold, and of spices very great store, and precious stones:
there came no more such abundance of spices such as these
"IOC
which the Queen of Sheba gave to King Solomon."
2 . Ethiopian Continuation
"And he (the king) paid her great honor and rejoiced.
...After six months stay, the Queen wanted to return to
her kingdom. 3y a trick he slept with her, and during the
216
I Kings X: 1-10.
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same night she dreamt that a brilliant sun, and it came down
from heaven and shed exceedingly great splendor over Israel.
...it suddenly withdrew itself and flew away to Ethiopia and
it shone there with exceeding great brightness forever, for
it willed to dwell there . The King understood that he would
have a child (from her) and gave her a ring saying 'Take
so that thou mayest not forget me . And if it happen that
I obtain seed from theee, this ring shall be unto it a sign;
and if it be a man child he shall come to me . . .and she brought
forth a man child. . .Menelik, and when he grew up, he wenx to
Jerusalem to visit his father. King Solomon received him
with great honor and urged his son to stay in Jerusalem
'where the house of God is, and where the Tabernacle of
the Law of God is, and where God dwelleth' . Menelik refused
and decided to return to his home-country, Ethiopia...
King Solomon made him King and gave him the first born sons
of Israel to go with him to Ethiopia. On their departure
they stole the real Ark of the Covenant and took it with
them. According to the Ethiopian oral tradition, at that
time Judaism was introduced to Ethiopia and the Ark of the
Covenant which was given to Moses by God, is believed to
be still in existence to day in Axum, the Sacred City of the
Ethiopians. It is firmly believed here in Ethiopia that the
Dynasty which was started by King Menelik I still continues
today in Ethiopia (1972).
"
21?
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